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WRITING to Pollock in 1928, Holmes mentioned that "some cove" was
trying to get him to review a forthcoming little book on covenants run-
ning with the land and went on, "It gave me a spell of the dry grins too
remember and to write that very nearly half a century had gone by since
that was a burning question for me." 1 In fact, it was in 1880, in the
lectures which became famous as The Common Laz, that Holmes had
defined "privity of estate" in real covenants in a manner which for clarity,
perspicacity, and practical point has never been surpassed.' Holmes's own
departures on the Massachusetts supreme bench from these conclusions
-made necessary by the force of local precedent-were understandable,
but regrettable, as he himself indicates;' and other attempts to evade
' United States Cii cuit judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. 2 HOL=s-Pou.ocr LnrrEs (Howe ed. 1941) 233. 234.
2. "According to the general opinion there must be a privity of estate between the
covenantor and covenantee in the latter class of cases [i.e., owvenants running with the
land] in order to bind the assigns of the covenantor. Some have supposed this privity
to be tenure; some, an interest of the covenantee in the land of the covenantor; and so en.
The first notion is false, the second misleading, and the proposition to which they are
applied is unfounded. Privity of estate, as used in connection with covenants at common
law, does not mean tenure or easement; it means succession to a title. It is never neces-
sary between covenantor and covenantee, or any other persons, except between the pres-
ent owner and the original covenantee. And on principle it is only necessary between them
in those cases-such as warranties, and probably covenants for title--where, the covenants
being regarded wholly from the side of contract, the benefit goes by way of succession,
and not with the land." HOLmES, Tim Cosmmo, LAw (181) 404.
3. Compare, for example, his statement in Norcross v. James. 141) Mass. 13, 1h0 ,
191, 2 N. E. 946, 947, 948 (1885) : "The privity of estate which is thus required [that an
assignee may sue on the covenant] is privity of estate with the original covenantee, net
with the original covenantor; and this is the only privity of which there is anything said
in the ancient books"; and the statement in respect to the assachusetts rule of covenants
in aid of easements, "which is generally true, although, as has been shown, not invariably
[citing the doctrine in Pakenhapm's Case]; and although not quite reconcilable with all
the old cases except by somewhat hypothetical historical explanation. But the expressitn
'privity of estate' in this sense is of modern use, and has been carried over from the
cases of warranty, where it was used with a wholly different meaning!' And compare,
also, somewhat similar apologies in Walsh v. Packard, 165 Mass. 1S9, 42 N. E. 577, 40
o9
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them have been at best confusing, at worst, disastrous. The latest of these
is the American Law Institute's Restatement, now almost completed, which
has at least been able to give a new and bizarre turn to an ancient subject.1
My own delvings in this subject, of course, cannot claim either the
authority or the antiquity of Holmes's. I first approached it almost a
quarter of a century ago in an article 5 which later formed a substantial
part of the little book Holmes so wisely declined to review." Yet, after
a complete re-examination of the authorities, lately made because of the
Institute's forthcoming Restatement, I have seen how much wiser Holmes
was than I in treating the subject with "a spell of the dry grins." For
this rather dreary and time-consuming task seems to have served only to
make the restaters more intransigent in their opposition to these rather
harmless property interests, while it reconvinced me of the contrary
view. And now that the matter is substantially concluded, with the In-
stitute juggernaut steadily rolling on its appointed course,' there may
be real doubt of the worth of devoting more good white paper to so nar-
row a corner of the law. Yet it is after all a rather fascinating corner,
at least from the standpoint of analytic and polemic discussion, as the
vast amount of time and money expended on it by the Institute indicates.'
L. R. A. 321 (1896). The Massachusetts rule is discussed below, see notes 25 and 26
and accompanying text infra; and the cases given in App. I infra.
4. RESTATEMENT, PROPrERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943). Of this final draft,
titled Servitudes, Part I, on Easements, containing six chapters and 176 pages, was finally
adopted at the Annual Meeting, May 11-14, 1943, while Part II, on Licenses, pages 177-
205, and Part III, on Promises Respecting the Use of Land, four chapters, pages 206-344,
were tentatively approved and referred back to the Reporter and his group for further
revision and final presentation next year. See notes 53, 101, and App. II inlra. While
this printed material represents the bulk of the proposed treatment of covenants, certain
additional material covering termination by eminent domain proceedings is to be included.
5. Clark, The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection with Real Covenants
(1922) 32 YALE L. J. 123. See also Clark, Party Wall Aureements as Real Covenan:ts
(1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 301. (The order of citation employed in this article substantially
follows that used by the writer in memoranda to the Institute, additional cases having
been added.)
6. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHvIC "RUN WITH LAND,"
INCLUDING LICENSES, EASEMENTS, PROFITS, EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS AND RENTS (1929).
Holmes in his letter refers to an intimation "that the author ran counter to some of my
views." 2 HoLtEs-PoLLocK LErTERS (Howe ed. 1941) 233, 234. But this was not as
to Holmes's definition of privity, see note 2 supra, but to his overdose assimilation his-
torically of these covenants to covenants of warranty, as well as to the later Massachu-
setts decisions. C.aK, supra at 94 et seq.
7. As to the scant likelihood of any substantial modification of the Restatement, sC6
notes 53, 101 and accompanying text infra, as well as App. II hira.
8. Work on the division of Servitudes of the Property Restatement commenced
October, 1934. While no public announcement of the Reporter's salary is made, it is com-
monly understood to be $5,000 a year, with research and clerical assistance also provided.
To this must, of course, be added the travel expenses of the Reporter and his Advisers,
honoraria to the Advisers, and final expenses of preparation for printing. It can hardly
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Moreover, it affords a prime case study of Institute methodology. And
the result suggests once more how difficult is the attempt to combine all
the varied and fluid developments of all the courts of all the different
sovereignties of this country into one uncompromising black-letter state-
ment to represent "the law" and how that backbreaking task tends in
final solution to lead to a one-man product, though authenticated and
stamped by the official seal of the Institute. An attempt to recount this
bit of recent American legal history may, therefore, be justifiable.
THE ISSUES INVOLVED
Controversial issues concerning the law of real covenants arise out
of the attempted transfer of obligations involving land with the transfer
of the land itself. May the benefit or the burden of a covenant entered
into by a landowner pass to some person to whom he thereafter trans-
fers the title? Although earlier history tends to approach this problem
as involving a land interest, such as, say, an easement,9 a modern view
has been to re-emphasize the difficulties early found in the law of ordinary
contracts and in the law of assignments of choses in action, which has
been recognized so haltingly and so comparatively recently in Anglo-
American history. Those who share this view think of the problem as
one of rationalization or justification (if not restriction) of the transfer
of covenant obligations to strangers. But it is now familiar law that
a vast quantity of agreements which have some intimate relationship to
land conveyed will pass with that land, so that enforcement can be had
between parties other than the original contractors. Perhaps most familiar
is the negative restriction on the use of land which has been so major
a factor in urban development of real estate in the past decades; and
the transfer of the benefit at least of various other covenants, such as
payment for the use of easements, party walls, and the like, is thoroughly
recognized.
Nevertheless, many have thought, and the Restatement accepts the
view, that there are substantial limitations-beyond those of form, intent,
and nature of the covenant as personal or real-which restrict or deny
the transfer of the burden of covenants with the land. Hence the con-
clusion has been reached that while the bcnefit of real covenants, as well
as the burden of negative restrictions, should run quite freely, the law
should put various obstacles--obstacles admittedly unrelated to the parties'
intent-in the way of the transfer of affirmative obligations. The subject
be doubted that the total cost of this Restatement will exceed $100,000 (of which prob-
ably at least one-half should be attributed to the subject of covenants). Text writers in
this field will doubtless compare ruefully the meager returns from the small books ordi-
narily needed to cover the subject with this rather munificent outlay.
9. Compare HOL.MEs, THE Commo- LAW (1881) 392 el seq.
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matter of this paper is, therefore, a consideration of the validity of the
distinctions thus made and the Institute's justification in taking them up
and in amplifying and expanding them.
Before considering these matters in detail, the writer must assert his
own belief that these distinctions, stated as abstract and general proposi-
tions applying to all real covenants, are quite unsupportable. They ap-
pear to be based at most on a kind of emotional fear that a purchaser of
property may perhaps be rendered bankrupt through the enforcement of
an obligation he had never intended to assume, coupled with the view that
a negative restriction on land utilization is, if not desirable, at least com-
paratively harmless since it can only lessen or destroy the owner's value
in such property. Needless to say, all of us may think up weird academic
cases; and, of course, a person can be brought to financial ruin by a law-
suit. As a practical matter, it is hard to say whether financial ruin might
be brought about more quickly by a judgment for damages for failing
to repair a roadway or a fence than by one for an injunction (enforce-
able by a jail sentence for contempt) compelling the taking down of an
apartment house built contrary to restriction.
There can be little doubt that generally speaking an injunction has been
considered a more drastic remedy than a judgment for money damages;
indeed, the latter is favored largely for that reason, except where neces-
sity points to the former." It is not now usual to lay down general rules
making the validity of land interests turn on such speculation, or, indeed,
to outlaw, out of hand and before the case has arisen, what parties nat-
urally and understandably may wish to do." About the only clear-cut
prohibition of this sort now thoroughly supported is the Rule against
Perpetuities. That rule is now of well-settled antiquity; its objective is
desirable and widely supported; and it at least attempts means adapted
to its end and objective.' 2 But in view of all the questions it has oc-
casioned, one may doubt that a court would think to create it now with-
out legislative support. Certainly its history suggests pause before we
create much more doubtful, uncertain, and uncanalized prohibitions
against the intent of landowners as to real covenants.
But, whatever the vague and extensive fears expressed as to these
land interests, the fact of the matter is that the cases do not lend support
10. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§938, 944-51; RESTATEMENT, CONTAc'rS
(1932) §§ 358-80.
11. A recent holding supporting freedom of contracting in the absence of a clear
showing that a statute (there the Copyright Act) is restrictive is to be found in Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U. S. 643 (1943), aff'g M. Witmark &
Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F. (2d) 949, 953, 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
12. Even this rule may now be doubtful and serve only the function of confusion,
See Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Trainhig
i the Public Interest (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 203, 254"
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for them. With almost inconsequential exceptions the cases involve simple,
practical agreements, where decision certainly need not be difficult. In
spite of all fears the chief questions arising as to affirmative covenants
seem to be almost entirely restricted to four classes of simple promises:
(1) those to keep in repair certain physical structures of the covenantee
(to repair fences, walls, roads, and so on) ; (2) those for the adjustment
of rights in party walls, that is, walls on the boundary line and intended
to be used by the adjoining landowners: (3) those for the adjustment
of water rights and for the payment of charges with respect thereto;
and (4) those to pay assessments to cover any of these matters. In Ap-
pendix I to this article an attempt is made to include all the American
cases on privity; certainly all those cited in his support by the Reporter
or relied on by others in this connection are there.'3 The reader is asked
to note how few there are which deviate at all from some phase of a
simple and helpful type of agreement for the adjustment of rights f ir
the mutual advantage of adjoining landowners. About the only cither
cases at all numerous concern early covenants by railroads for stations
at certain places in return for land conveyed-which in general satisfy
the requirements here discussed and are no longer practically important
in view of the strict supervision of railroads-and covenants to prevent
business competition on certain property, which are, of course, a type of
negative restriction on use. And a court can easily find sufficient scoet
to take care of such few covenants as desirably should not run, under
existing and well-settled rules, as to formality of the agreement, intent if
the parties, touching and concerning of the promise (that is, real as against
personal covenants), and particularly proof of loss, actual or threatened, to
the suing party.
14
It is submitted that an exclusive concern for the effects of a money judg-
ment-not shared as to other remedies-is unreal in the light of histor-,
as well as of practical business policies. The adjustment of debts, through
the now manifold devices offered by the Bankruptcy Act, or. as perhaps
more often, through compromise with a creditor who is willing to take
half a loaf in preference to 10 per cent or none at all, is too well known
to arouse so much opposition as the Institute has shown. There is no
reason why all covenants to repair roads and fences, for example, should
be visited with a disapproval not accorded to covenants requiring the
13. App. I, pp. 731-36 infra.
14. This simple requirement of proof of injury will do away with mvist, if nt all, of
the horror cases of various sorts envisaged by the Reporter. Conceivably, uf cvurse, a
breach of contract without a showing of actual loss justifies an amard of nominal dam-
ages only. RESTATEmEXT, CONTRAcr.s (1932) § 328. How far that rule should he applied
in a land case is not clear, and practically, there is little danger of a suit for merely ncm-
inal damages unless there is something more at stake.
19431
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building of only a highly expensive residence or the selling to certain kinds
of persons only."5
The matter assumes a further air of unreality when it is recalled that
the drastic remedy of forfeiture of the estate may be made readily ap-
plicable by creating obligations of this general nature in the form of
conditions subsequent or of conditional limitations on the estate granted.
Nonperformance of a condition subsequent gives the grantor or his
representative a right of re-entry, while an estate granted on limitation
expires with the happening of the specified event, which may be made
the failure of the holder of the estate to perform an agreed-upon act."
Finally, there seems no a priori reason for making a complete dif-
ferentiation between the running of the benefit and the running of the
burden of real covenants. If, indeed, the objections to the running of the
burden of real covenants are only logical and historical, they are equally
applicable to the running of the benefit of real covenants. If the ob-
jections are truly on the ground of policy, it is submitted that we cannot
know what is desirable policy until we have the concrete case.' 7 Just
as there are cases where mutual property adjustments point to the desir-
ability of the running of certain burdens, so it seems obvious that certain
benefits should not be allowed to pass. The situation becomes particularly
anomalous if the benefit is allowed to run while the burden is not, con-
trary to the parties' intent that both should run mutually. Suppose vari-
ous landowners get together and make a covenant to provide for the ex-
15. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § 87, comments d-Y,
does provide that the restriction must be neither illegal nor unreasonable, and the latter
is left very vague.
16. RESTATEMiENT, PROPERTY (1936) §§ 23-25, 154-55. In case of doubt a provision
is to be construed as a condition, rather than a covenant. Los Angeles University v,
Swarth, 107 Fed. 798 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901); Plymouth v. Carver, 16 Pick. 183 (Mass,
1834).
17. It is believed that the chief objection to this kind of encumbrance is not its orig-
inal grant, which may, indeed, facilitate opportunities for sale and transfer, but its long-
continued duration after its utility to the parties has ceased. Indeed, suggestions made for
legislative reform to the Property Section of the A. B. A. have been favorably received.
See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 737, with form of statute
providing for termination in the absence of renewal and discussing model statutes from
Massachusetts and Minnesota. The suggestion was referred to the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which, it is understood, has a committee on
the subject. See also Rhodes, Real Property Restrictions in Connecticnt (1943) 17 CoNN.
B. J. 12, 24-28. A far-reaching statute of this type has recettly been passed in Wisconsin.
Wis. Stat. 1941, § 330.15, as amended; (1942) Wis. L. REv. 258-79. Final decisions as
to policy are, of course, not easy to make, but it is perhaps important that those inter.
ested in modern housing developments and community planning protested that the writer's
suggestions might prove too drastic. So a limitation whs added to the proposed statute
to allow of continuance of the restrictions by majority action of the group involved. See
Clark, supra at 741 and note 30, the latter giving references showing the importance of
restrictions in such developments.
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pense of irrigating their respective pieces of land and for the payment
of future upkeep and cost of the irrigation. X. one of the landowners,
sells out to Y and departs to another country. An absolute rule of law
to the effect that Y gets the benefit of all the covenants of his neighbors
as to the irrigation, but assumes no contractual obligation in the premises,
seems not merely highly anomalous, but quite arbitrary."8 The distinc-
tions thus attempted are but modern and confused ideas which are not
substantially buttressed in case authority and not deserving of perpetu-
ation in an American corpus juris.
CONFUSION OF THE CASES
Notwithstanding historical claims to the contrary, these questions did
not assume importance in the cases until comparatively modern times."2
In 1789, a reactionary and dullish judge, Lord Kenyon,20 purely by way
of dictum and without citation of cases, asserted, in what is still the
most cited authority for the point, that "it is not sufficient that a cove-
nant is concerning the land, but, in order to make it run with the land,
there must be a privity of estate between the covenanting parties." 2'
So insignificant is the case itself as an authority and so far removed from
anything practically affecting our law that it is, indeed, surprising it should
have been picked up and so often cited since.-2 At any rate, the idea
that there must be some nebulous binding tie called "privity of estate,"
which is something other and additional to the contract itself, but ex-
isting between the covenanting parties, before the covenant will be al-
lowed to run, has had some vogue, as the later discussion herein shows,
18. The water-right cases are referred to in note 69, and App. I infra.
19. The historical material is discussed in notes 78483 and accompanying text infra.
20. Compare 6 WIGamoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1858 ("tis reactionary");
8 id. § 2217; Bordwell, Book Review (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 838, 839 C'a lawyer of very
narrow training who was inclined to go off half-cocked") (reviewing CLtAn, lec. cit.
supra note 6).
21. Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 393, 402, 100 Eng. Rep. 639, 644 (K. B. 1789). A few
earlier statements, as in Bally v. Wells, 3 Wils. K. B. 25, 95 Eng. Rep. 913, Wilm. 341,
97 Eng. Rep. 130 (K. B. 1769), do not attempt to define the phrase and are consistent
with Holmes's view, note 2 supra. See CL&aR, op. cit. supra note 6, at 72, 98.
22. This was a covenant to pay rent and to repair, made by the defendant lesce
with the mortgagor; and the court adopted the premise, long since repudiated, Munici-
pal Permanent Investment Bldg. Soc. v. Smith, 22 Q. B. D. 70 (18RS), that the mort-
gagor was a stranger to the land because he had conveyed away his legal title. Of course,
on that premise, the benefit of the covenant would not run, for it was obviously in gross,
as was so held in allowing recovery by the original promisee. Stukes Y. Russell, 3 T. R.
678, 100 Eng. Rep. 799 (K. B. 1790), 1 H. BI. 562, 566, 126 Eng. Rep. 323, 325 (E.L
1791). It is time that the blight of Webb v. Russell as a restriction on mcdern American
law is removed and the earlier English cases are given their proper weight. See
CLAPK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 97, 98, 121; and Bordwell, loc. cit. supra note 20.
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and is now to be enshrined as the fundamental requirement of the Re-
statement.
Quite naturally there has been the greatest dispute as to what privity
of estate means. As Holmes pointed out so clearly in The Common Law,
the only privity, outside of the privity of the contract itself, which has
any sense is the privity by way of succession to the landholding of one
of the original contracting parties.2 Thus, where the covenant has been
between A and B, and X buys the land of A, the covenantor, X can
properly be said to be in privity of estate with A. And when Y buys the
land of B, the covenantee, Y is in privity of estate with B. That is a
logical and an understandable rule.2'4 But there is nothing to be said,
either logically or practically, for some requirement that A and B shall
have a mystic bond before they can formally contract in such a way as
intentionally to bind their respective assignees.
If such a bond were to be required between the contracting parties, of
what could it consist? In Massachusetts there developed a view that
privity must be by way of "substituted tenure" and that the contracting
parties must have some other tie, if not that of the land itself, as in the
case of landlord and tenant, then at least of an easement, to which the
covenant should attach itself.2" This appears to have been an attempt to
approximate the feudal system and the doctrine of subinfeudation, which
was abolished by the statute Quia Emptores in 1290. As has often been
pointed out, there is, therefore, little to be said for it logically, because
its historical analogy is far-fetched, to put it mildly. Possibly a little
more may be said for it on practical grounds as it seems on the surface
to have some measure of fireside equity; a binding covenant between
landowners cannot run as an encumbrance unless the parcels of land in-
volved are bound to each other by some already existing encumbrance,
such as an easement. Upon reflection, however, one cannot perceive why
this should be so. If a binding covenant is loathsome, how does it become
any more attractive if the parties already have an inconsiderable ease-
ment? Or if the parties solemnly covenant that certain things should be
mutually performed, why is it that their own solemn declaration must be
conditioned upon their having taken pains then or earlier to create a cove-
nant? As a matter of fact, outside of some dicta, the Massachusetts rule
seems to have had no vogue in other states. 0
23. See note 2 su pra.
24. Restated as section 83, RESTATEMtENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943).
25. Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1837), is the early and leading case; for
later ramifications of the rule, see App. I infra.
26. The case of Gilmer v. Mobile & M. Ry., 79 Ala. 569 (1885), is often cited in
support; but the rather weak dictum there seems quite dissipated by later cases, as shown
in App. I infra. Other cases, including some of the early New York cases and Lingle
Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931),
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Another rule, to which greater lip service is paid, is to the effect that
there must be some conveyance between the parties to uphold the covenant.
Here, while the supporting dicta are more numerous, actual enforcement
of its requirements have been few. The two old leading instances of such
enforcement, one from Maine and one from Nevada, are' good illustra-
tions of what it would mean if the rule were to be enforced generally.
In both the parties appear to have forgotten to include the covenant at the
time they made their conveyance. In one it was executed one day, and in
the other it was executed six days, after the conveyance.' Why a cove-
nant in every respect sufficient as to form should be invalid to fulfill the
intent of the parties to it because it happens to be made not in the con-
veyance, but one day thereafter, is hard to understand. It has been
suggested that this requirement does insure deliberation on the part cof
the parties before they assume burdensome obligations." But that it
would have such an effect is, at best, sheer guesswork, and actually thi.,
rationalization of the rule has never been thought of or suggested in any
of the cases which have considered the matter. In practical fact, it would
seem that the parties must have shown more deliberation to enter into
a contract as a separate transaction after a conveyance has been completed
than to make it merely as one of the several made as a part of the con-
veyance itself. The act thus to be required has no natural connection
whatever with the result assumed for it in the law. It is not the kind oif
thing which a layman would think of doing; nor does the requirement
have any logical or reasonable connection with their acts. Its only effect
is to put a premium on the activities of conveyancers, for (obviously thoze
in the know would satisfy all formalities by an exchange of mutual deeds
in order thus to obtain the conveyance to which the covenant might at-
tach.
THE INSTITUTE'S SOLUTION
It will be noted that the two rules of privity of estate discussed abotvc-
the Massachusetts rule of privity by substituted tenure, and the other,
do not discriminate between this and other types of privity. But perhaps Middletojwn
v. Newport Hospital, 16 R. I. 319, 15 At. 800 (188), is the nearest to a direct dictum
in favor of the Massachusetts rule. Compare strong criticism in Burbank v. Pilhour,
48 N. H. 475 (1869). For the facts of these and other cases cited in the nutes herein-
after, see App. I infra.
27. Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64 (1868) ; Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871).
28. By one of the Advisers. See App. II infra. 'Mr. Sims has also suggested that the
requirement is salutary, as preventing the too frequent exercise of the power to bind land
and restricting it to those cases only "where the covenant figures in the general value Uf
the land in a sale." SIs, COVENANTS WHimc RuN wiTH L ND (1901) 28. The w riter
repeats what he said in CLARK. op. cit. mipra note 6, at 99: "Why is mere frequency cf
use a vice, and why is a covenant figuring merely in the general sale price uf land mi.r%
desirable than one bought and paid for separately?" And is not this guesswork, tao?
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of so-called privity by deed-are logically inconsistent and unrelated in
anything other than their destructive intent, although they may overlap.
They proceed on different assumptions and require different circumstances
for their respective operations. What should be done with two such
strange and uhlike animals?
What the Institute did was, first, to include both in its Restatement,
and in a single black letter at that. So we have the following, which in
clause (a) sets forth the Massachusetts rule in substance, and in clause
(b) the rule of privity by deed:
"§ 82. Privity between Promisee and Promisor.
"The successor in interest to one who has made a promise respect-
ing the use of his land is not liable as a promisor upon the promise,
unless
(a) the promise is made in the adjustment of the mutual relation-
ships arising out of the existence of an easement held by one of
the parties to the promise in the land of the other, or
(b) the transaction of which the promise is a part includes a trans-
fer of an interest either in the land benefited by or in the land
burdened by the performance of the promise." 20
The above is thus an either-or proposition, so that compliance with
either subdivision will satisfy the main requirement. But this is not only
a curious way to state a prohibition (in view of the unlike qualities of
the two propositions) ; it is not an effective way of fulfilling the Insti-
tute's avowed objective of discouraging and getting rid of these unwhole-
some land encumbrances. Since, indeed, almost all covenants turn out
to satisfy one or the other of these requirements, only a very small residue
of occasional covenants, prepared either by na've and trusting laymen or
by the dumbest of lawyers, can be upset. Something more drastic was,
therefore, necessary.
And that brings us to the Institute's second line of defense against this
treacherous enemy, to be found in another section, 85. This, I submit, is
the most unusual Restatement yet framed-in its origin without case
precedent, in its persistence against unanswered criticism and objection
from many distinguished minds, and in its obvious blunderbuss effect in
rendering all affirmative real covenants doubtful. It is as follows:
"§ 85. Promises 'Touching and Concerning' Land.
"A promise respecting the use of land of the promisor can bind
as promisors the successors of the original promisor only if
(a) the performance of the promise will benefit the promisee or
other beneficiary of the promise in the physical use or enjoy-
ment of land possessed by him. or the consummation of the
transaction of which it is a part will operate to benefit and is for
29. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § 82. This was Chap-
ter 2, section 5, of RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (2) (Council Draft No. 1, 1943).
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the benefit of the promisor in the physical use or enjoyment of
land possessed by him and
(b) the burden on the land of the promisor bears a reasonable rela-
tion to the benefit received by the person benefited." cO
Now we may note, first, that this is a masquerader, appearing under
a mask of apparent respectability and currying favor and support by
reason of its false garb. It is set forth as the rule of "touching and con-
cerning," a well-settled rule that the agreement must have something to
do with the land, must in a metaphorical phrase "touch or concern" it,
and must not be merely personal and collateral, in order to be a matter of
land contract in any event. But actually the "touching and concerning"
rule is not stated here; in fact, it appears elsewhere, but only as a kind of
introductory note to the entire Restatement of this subject.3
Next, it is a curiosity because not a single authority anywhere has been
brought forth in actual support of this section. Indeed, the Reporter claims
it only as a kind of distilled essence of the cases and as the logical end
towards which they tend. Many have been fooled into believing that the
large number of cases dealing with the "touching and concerning" re-
quirement do support it; but, as hereinafter pointed out, only a limited
analysis is needed to demonstrate that this is a different kind of require-
ment, a requirement of a binding tie of some vague nebulous character
between the plaintiff and the defendant. 2 That the Institute should re-
vert to such a subterfuge in an endeavor to get support for the unsupport-
able is one of the more questionable details of this involved story.
Going further, the two separate parts into which the section is divided
must be considered. The section as a whole has received the disapproval
of the Advisers and the Executive Committee, and clause (b) has met
with disfavor, if not formal disapproval, wherever it has been presented;
and yet the material still stands a tribute to the pertinacity of the Re-
porter and the valiant support given him by the Director." Clause (a)
is reminiscent of the 'Massachusetts rule already stated in the earlier pro-
vision, since, in effect, it requires the tying of the promisor's estate in
land to that of the promisee and thus prohibits covenants in gross. Thus
it serves to take back the alternative grant made by clause (b) of 82.
30. REsTATE mT, PROPMRTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § 85. This was Chap-
ter 2, section 8, of REsTATE EmT, PaopEr.v (2) (Council Draft No. 1, 1943).
31. N\rote on tse of phrase "Promises Respecting the Use of Land:' REsTr .TN-.T,
PRoPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) 208-10, which attempts a rationalization of
the distinction between real and personal covenants, but pointedly avoids all mention of the
historic and important doctrine of "touching and concerning." See discussion infra at
723-25.
32. See discussion infra at 724. Compare the confusion at the Annual Meeting
by this use of a well-settled doctrine, with many suppturting cases to uphold this pure
novelty, App. II infra.
33. See App. II infra.
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Since even that was not enough, the now famous clause (b) has been de-
vised to give the coup de grdce to these covenants. By it any affirmative
covenant, even of the simplest kind, is rendered doubtful, subject to some
vague and nebulous requirement of equality of bargaining results, to be
settled only by a court adjudication, perhaps years later, made for the one
particular case. Thus the clause makes all covenant titles uncertain and
defective.
Although the writer has tried to discover a respectable parentage for
this latest requirement, he has found none. Perhaps there is a faint anal-
ogy between it and the idea of benefit and detriment in the law of con-
sideration in contracts, but it is well-known that even in that doctrine there
is no attempt to measure the values received by the respective parties.
Perhaps, too, the clause is fairly reminiscent of the ordinary requirement
(one which ought to have gone far to quiet the restaters' fears of inequit-
able decisions) that a plaintiff must show injury, actual or threatened,
before he may recover; but it is obvious that the operation of that rational,
effective, and comparatively clear-cut principle is quite other than the
blunderbuss effect of this rule. 4 Apparently it can mean only that the
court shall try to see if the defendant got as good a bargain as the plaintiff
-obviously a hopeless task for any court and one which can be made
sensible only by saying in effect that practically no covenant should run.
In view of all the vicissitudes which this section, and particularly its clause
(b), has experienced, it does seem surprising that there appears to be no
modification of the program to announce it as the law of the land."
So bizarre is the formulation of statement of "living law" which results
from the combination of these two sections that perhaps it can be best
illustrated by analogy. Let us suppose a requirement that for the burden
of a real covenant to run the original promisor must either (a) have had
red hair or (b) be able to write his name; provided, however, that no such
covenant will run in any event unless he (a) is redheaded and (b) also
gets a very good bargain from the promisee. Of course, a "very good bar-
gain" is not precise; perhaps we may substitute "as much as, if not more
34. See note 14 supra.
35. See notes 53, 101, and App. II infra. It may be noted, too, that in accordance
with the Reporter's objective of discouraging all running covenants, he has followed the
minority view of Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 189, 2 N. E. 946 (1885), that the
burden of a covenant not to conduct a certain business on described land does not run.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § 85, comment f, and
illus. 1; cf. id. § 87, comment f. The cases are divided as to whether the restriction is
in restraint of trade, but it is upheld as not unreasonable in many well-considered cases,
e.g., Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916); Natural
Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 309 Ill. 230, 140 N. E. 840 (1923). Other cases
are cited in App. I infra. See also Walsh, Conditional Estates and Covenants Ruminy
With the Land (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 162, 171'; (1933) 11 CuI-KENT REv. 122;
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 447; (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 125; Clark, op. cit. supra note 6, at
84, 150; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 482.
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than, the promisee can get out of the land." It is submitted that such a
complex of requirements corresponds well with that actually set forth,
both in its remoteness from the realities of how parties act and the com-
plicated machinery by which ultimately all burdensome covenants are
rendered doubtful.
In setting forth these requirements of the Restatement, the attempt is
made to follow what, after repeated explanations by him, is understood
to be the Reporter's intent and meaning, without considering critically
the language employed in the two sections. At least, however, it should
be pointed out that the form of expression is vague and unclear and pre-
sents many problems of interpretation. Thus, the natural reading of
clause (a) of 82 suggests that the easement must already be in existence,
not created by the covenant; and adjustment of "mutual relationships"
appears to require something more extensive than merely one simple
promise. Hence the provision is easily susceptible of an interpretation
more harsh than even the Massachusetts rule. On the other hand, the
word "transaction" of clause (b) of 82 suggests something broader than
"contained in a deed of conveyance" and might cover a promise made
several days later, while the transfer may be of any interest and of any
form or manner. Suppose a party to the covenant utilizes the occasion
of its execution to make a gift out of his estate in the land to his wife
for life, or a lease to a tenant; the stated requirements are met. And, of
course, in accordance with the illogical premises assumed, it makes not a
whit of difference whether the benefit of the deed (or easement, if any)
runs with the benefit of the covenant or quite opposite to it.
Again, section 85 has been objected to as unintelligible, and the draft
originally presented to the Council was sent back because no one could
understand it." Even as refashioned, it has confusions beyond its in-
tended vagueness of scope. Thus, the Reporter has denied that it has the
effect-so notable a feature of the Massachusetts rule-of preventing the
running of covenants in gross, that is, where one end is personal. But
it seems indisputable that each party must have an interest in land. That
is stated as to each one in so many words in clause (a), though there the
requirement might perhaps be interpreted as only an alternative one; but
the intent to make the requirement double-barreled is made clear in clause
(b), where the burden on the promisor's land is balanced against the
benefit received by the promisee in the use of his land.YI Hence, outside
of the covenants so usual in leases"8 and outside of perhaps a very oc-
36. At the meeting of the Council in February, 1943. See App. II bin ra.
37. This phrase is not formally repeated in clause (b). But it is clearly to be under-
stood there, as, indeed, is expressly stated in comment b to section 85. See also Note oil
use of phrase "Promises Respecting the Use of Land." loc. cit. mtpra note 31.
38. Covenants between landlords and tenants have met with much less disfavor upran
the part of writers and others, often attributed to the existence of the statute of 32 Hr.-.
VIII, c. 34 (1540) [cf. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PRorE"Ty (3d ed. 1939) § 125; 3 id. §848)],
19431
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casional case beyond those involving a lease where both promisor and
promisee have separate estates in the same land, the section necessarily
presupposes and requires the tying together of two separate pieces of
land.39
Just as this complicated arrangement is designed to catch case sup-
port of various types for the set purpose of invalidating a certain group
of covenants by indirect, rather than direct, prohibition, so the arrange-
ment of Part III of the Restatement as a whole is made unnecessarily
complicated to this same end. Part III contains some 180 pages of at-
tempted differentiation, with much repetitive statement, as to the running
of burdens, the running of benefits, the difference in situation "in equity"
from that "at law," the remedy of "lien," and so on. Not only is this
wasteful; it is actually misleading, as suggesting opposing lines of law
beyond any logical or practical justification in the situation and distinc-
tions in the precedents of a picayunish sort-such as that case X is not
really opposed to section 82, for it is all covered in sections 95 or 88 or
87 or somewhere else. A simple, consolidated statement of, say, twenty-
five pages might have been made to cover all that is proper to be said here
with much greater accuracy and undoubted clarity, once the purpose of
forming a superstructure upon which to scatter the cases was given up.
Reference has already been made to the unreality of now making a sharp
distinction in statement between "equity" and "law" or between injunction
and damages; now it is necessary to say something particularly of section
88, entitled "Lien." 40
That section seems to the writer to be of the subterfuge nature which
to him is so distasteful a feature of this Restatement. On the surface it
seems to accord a simple and effective remedy for the enforcement of
covenants (by lien on the land) so as to make the remedy of a money
judgment seem unnecessarily harsh to the parties. If the remedy by lien
were freely available, it might be argued that the money judgment was
unnecessary, though hardly that it was by nature harsher than the lien.
But, of course, it is rarely available, except as a step in enforcing a judg-
ment; that is, the money judgment is, by history and by practice, a neces-
sary condition precedent, save in the rare cases where a statute may have
specially accorded the remedy "' or the parties may have contracted for
it. The fact is that, generally speaking, this is not a separate remedy,
but only a step in the enforcement of judgments; and it does not ap-
although, as suggested in note 83 infra, there is a tendency to overemphasize the effect
of this statute. See Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases (1914) 12 Mien. L.
Rzv. 639, (1914) 30 L. Q. REv. 319. Covenants in leases are excluded from this Restate-
ment. REsTATEmENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) Scope Note, 207.
39. Cases contra are particularly noted in notes 70-72 infra.
40. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § 88.
41. Compare Nebraska and California in notes 63, 64, and App. I infra.
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pear to have been similarly played up in other Restatements-Contracts,
Torts, for example-where it was available."2 To give it this substantial
place and format here is illusory and misleading.
A word more should be said as to the lien by contract of the parties.
One wonders, in view of the drastic nature of this remedy and the inter-
diction put upon the parties' desires by other parts of this Restatement,
how it came to be treated with such exceptional favor. In truth, there is
very little law on the particular subject, presumably because it is not a
natural remedy for the parties to seek and, moreover, a covenantor would
be very foolish to promise it. For in character and extent it seems much
more drastic than the money judgment or other encumbrances, such
as a mortgage; these, when upheld, are at least precise and definite in ex-
tent. The nature of the notice, conveyed by recording acts, of such an
agreement for lien and its validity against subsequent takers require care-
ful consideration. Presumably the lien must operate from the time of the
original agreement, duly recorded; there is no later document to give any
notice. Hence it might be effective to secure definite water rates-as in
the few cases where it seems to have been granted by statute 43 -or other
definite recurring payments. It is seriously to be doubted whether it can
be made a general remedy for breach of contract against bona fide pur-
chasers, although the Restatement says broadly and simply that "it is
sufficiently a conveyance to come within the operation of the recording
acts." a
Before passing to a more detailed consideration of the case law, per-
haps it is incumbent on the writer to avoid the charge of being merely
destructive in his criticisms by stating how he thinks the law should be
formulated. But this he has done so extensively elsewhere " that a brief
statement should suffice. Of course, he does not believe in a single black
letter; the attempt to compress fluid law of many jurisdictions into one
arbitrary statement is bound to mislead more than it clarifies. That is an
old story, not to be repeated here.4" Any statement of the better rule,
however, should omit both sections 82 and 85 entirely, should rely only
on the privity by way of succession to the estate of one of the parties,
as set forth by Holmes and section 83 of the Restatement,' 7 and shuuld
be simply and concisely stated as an integrated whole for benefit and bur-
den and for the various remedies available to all.
42. Compare RESTATEMENT. CoNmxcrs (1932) § 326.
43. See notes 63, 64, and App. I in!ra.
44. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § "B, cmment 1.
That a judgment lien is statutory only, see Wells v. Benton, 108 Ind. 585, 8 N. E. 444,
9 N. E. 601 (1896).
45. See, e.g.. CLA~x, op. cit. supra note 6, cc. 4, 5; Clark, supra note 5, 32 YA,%L. J.
123, 37 H.Ri L. REV% 301.
46. See Clark, The Restatement of the Lazo of Contracts (1933) 42 Y,-,LE L. J. 643.
47. Compare notes 2, 24 supra.
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While this is believed to be the conclusion pointed to both by the authori-
ties and by sound policy,4" it should be added that other, forms of state-
ment might be made which would express a different policy and yet not
be lacking in intellectual frankness. A statement that no affirmative real
covenants, or only certain named ones, would run would have the support
of at least a few precedents ;"D and it would present the issue in an entirely
straightforward fashion.
THE CASE LAW
Every lawyer is trained in the game of "the weight of authority"; to
distinguish away your opponent's cases and build up all those glancing in
your direction is a sign of the legal mind. In a field of such diverse
thought as has developed here, it would seem not very worth while to
play this game, beyond relying upon this divergence as a freeing, not an
inhibiting, factor-one which allows us some scope to work out a "better
rule" and does not paralyze all efforts at clarity and policy-stating. But
since the Institute so definitely maintains its purpose to state "existing
law" as shown by authority, the rest of us should certainly be ready to
follow along; for, as the writer firmly believes, the precedents do not
fairly support either or both branches of section 82, or section 85 at all,
and a fortiori, if not concededly, the resulting combination in its totality
pictures a law that never was on sea or land or in any jurisdiction or
dominion.
It happens that we have at hand a direct picture of how the Institute
views its own activities, for Judge Goodrich, the Institute's Adviser on
Professional Relations, in reporting the action of the Annual Meeting
on this issue, says just a bit smugly that "the fundamental policy of the
Institute" "was made clear in the action taken." "The issue presented was
whether the classic and accepted requirement of privity be retained.
Though there was disagreement with the principle, it was accepted as whiul
the law was rather than what it should be, since the function of the Insti-
tute was, wherever possible, to restate the law not to inake it." 10 One
might suggest with all deference that this is putting it on a bit thick. Waiv-
ing queries as to other Restatements, now perhaps ancient history, t or
48. See note 17 supra.
49. See jurisdictions referred to in notes 61, 62 infra.
50. Goodrich, American Law Institute Annual Meeting (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 353,
356 (italics added). Of course, these claims for the Institute are not unusual; compare
reference to some of them in McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus
Clarification and Reform (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1077.
51. Thus CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942),
is essentially devoted to a challenge of the "as-isness" of the Conflicts Restatement. To the
writer the crowning example of defying modern law still is RESTATEmENT, PRoPMt'rv
(1936) § 27, and illus. 2, that a grant "to B forever" and "to B in fee simple" in each
[Vol. 52 : 699
1943] INSTITUTE'S LAW OF REAL COVENANTS 715
even as to some rather wild departures from precedent and desirable prac-
tice in the part on easements just adopted by the Institute (notably with re-
spect to the assig-nability of easements in gross '2), such a portraiture
by no stretch of consideration can apply to section 85. Indeed, Judge
Goodrich practically concedes as much, for later lie attempts a para-
phrase of that section (showing as much difficulty as everyone else in
understanding it) which he introduces with the masterly understatement
that it is "a problem on which the state of authorities was less certain." '3
But even with respect to the "accepted principle" of section 82, let us
see how thoroughly it does represent the law "as is." In a game where
there are no clearly formulated rules, perhaps no holds are to be considered
barred; but if there are any, it would seem that they have not troubled the
Reporter, for he has carried both the collecting and the distinguishing
away of authorities to unusual extremes. Reference has already been made
case gives B only an estate for his life-a rule which rather doubtfully may be suppurted
by the law of a single state.
52. Over the advice of distinguished Advisers-as shown in earlier drafts, thugh,
rather curiously, no dissent is noted in section 40 and the following sections of the Pro-
posed Final Draft--easements in gross, "if of a commercial character," are alienable,
and if non-commercial, are only alienable depending on the manner or terms of their crea-
tion. Such an asserted distinction between commercial and non-commercial easements is
unknown to the law, there being no precedents for it; and it is believed to be demonstra-
bly unworkable and merely confusing. When is a right of wvay commercial and when is
it not? Would the alienability of a right of way to a private garage depend upon whether
an adjoining house is lived in by the owner or rented, or whether it is a two-family
house, an apartment house, or some other sort of residence? This highly original de-
parture from the law, now finally adopted by the Institute, will, if followed by the cuurts,
tend to make all these interests quite indefinite and uncertain and require the meaning
of each to be passed on by a court before its title can be certified. In fact, the entire sub-
ject of easements and licenses as restated has many defects and inconsistencies with ordi-
nary views, and has already brought forth criticisms in the law reviews, e.g., the at-
tempted restriction of easements to some peculiar kind of grant, thus distinguishing away
what should be the completely assimilated so-called executed license, the doing away with
the commonly used term "profits," the use of the term "license!' misleadingly as defining
a recognized legal interest apart from easements or other servitudes, whereas it is but
a grant of permission which may have varying results dependent on the particular facts,
and so on. Compare acute criticism by Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land (1942)
42 CoL. L. REv. 809, 828. See also Conard, The Requirement of a Scaled Instrament f, r
Conveying Easements (1940) 26 IowA L. REy. 41, Words IWhich Will Create an Ease-
ment (1941) 6 Mo. L. Rm. 245, Easements, Licenses and the Statittes of Frau:ds (1941)
15 TarP. L. Q. 222, Unwritten Agreements for the Use of Land (1942) 14 Rucy MT.
L. RFv. 153, 294, Easement Novelties (1942) 30 CALIF. L. REv. 125. The result is that the
Restatement of Easements and Licenses is almost as confusing and upsetting to pruperty
law as is the Restatement of Covenants. Although the writer's name is carried as Ad-
viser, he had nothing to do with this part of the Restatement.
53. Goodrich, Amwrican Law Institute Annual Meeting (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 353,
356. He goes on to say that the statement by the Reporter was "approved," though it is
quite clear that this was not the fact, at least as to clause (b) uf 85. See App. II infra.
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to the careful arrangement of sections and subsections to catch all possible
citations, whether mutually consistent or not, in support of restrictions
and to distinguish away (as in another section) cases which are opposed.
That is the keystone of his analysis of case authority. Of course, the
greater amount of material he relies on must be dicta because so very few
covenants have actually been outlawed. If, of course, the judge has
specifically relied on some rule of privity as justifying his affirmative
holding, that must be considered some authority for a belief that it is
necessary, although even there it is not a decision. But it should not be
enough that the judge has made some confused reference to privity, not
distinguishing interparty privity from the recognized privity by succes-
sion, or that careful, even pedantic, analysis might have found some
ground, other than that seemingly in the judge's mind, for allowing the
covenant to run even under the Restatement restrictions. After all, this
is a prohibition on carrying out the parties' wishes expressed in formal
contracts; it must be supported by affirmative precedents, not by the ab-
sence of opposing authorities. 4 And it certainly seems unfair at the same
time to reject out of hand all cases objecting to these restrictive rules
which discuss the running of benefit or of negative burdens "in equity."
A fairer way to play the game would seem to be to consider first as
primary authorities those cases of actual decision as to the running or
non-running of affirmative covenants, and thereafter as secondary authori-
ties of some bearing such cases as contain rather vrecie and informed
dicta pro or con. And, finally, the over-all result that on some ground or
other the covenants almost always are permitted to run when the parties
so desire should carry some weight.
In view, therefore, of the directly conflicting claims made as to the
meaning of the cases, case analysis here is particularly tricky, as well as
important because of the way the issue has been framed. It has been diffi-
cult to decide how to state this mass of precedent properly and still re-
main within the confines of an article. The cases really should be ex-
amined in the library and in detail; I have continuously urged that this
54. See discussion of general policy as to clogs on contracting power, notes 11, 17
supra. Rather curiously, however, there seems to be a tendency to put the burden upon
those who would deny clogs upon contracting. Thus, the Reporter appears in substance
to count as favorable to the Restatement those jurisdictions which have not passed upon
the matter at all; and Mr. Sims, distinguished member of the Council and author of
Covenants Which Rim with Land, while generously granting the writer some ten states
in his support, and this, too, without making reference to the important cases of covenants
in gross referred to particularly in note 71 infra [a generosity which compares with the
Reporter's concession of only Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 Atl. 706 (1890), as sup-
porting the writer's views], nevertheless holds that this is not enough and, upon citing
a lesser number, many of which are at most dicta, eventually agrees that the weight of
authority is with the Reporter. The writer does not understand such fixing of the bur-
den of proof as to "the weight of authority."
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be done by a committee of the Council or otherwise. But this is a tim:-
consuming, thankless job and probably has not been done by o ver, at ni ,st.
three or four parties to the present dispute. At any rate, the expedient
here adopted is that of stating and commenting on each case only Iy way
of an appendix to this article ;5- while only a summary and general state-
ment as to the case authority is here attempted.
In the writer's judgment, the only jurisdictimins to lie counted definitely
for parts of section 82 on the basis of actual and still not overruled de-
cisions are Massachusetts for clause (a)"o and Maine, Nevada, and Wvoni-
ing 57 (and perhaps Tennessee. though this is by no means clear" ) for
clause (b). The decisions from Maine and Nevada are old, contain noi
clear-cut discussion, and, particularly in view of their harsh character,
may stand as not overruled merely because no new case has arisen to call
forth a re-examination of the problem. The Wyoming case, however, is
fairly recent, with a considerable discussion; and because of its peculiar
features and because it seems to be the Reporter's basic authority, the
one case which in the last analysis probably led him to feel justified in the
Restatement he has sponsored, it will be considered in it ore detail below 
.
Beyond this, the Reporter can properly cite for either one branch or the
other of his section 82-but more doubtfully for both-a certain amount
of dicta, not so very strong, in favor of one or the other rules, or at times
an apparently indiscriminate conglomeration of both." In this connectio n
it should be pointed out that he cannot properly include jurisdictions, such
as New York, where after various decisions, some on either side of the
fence, the court eventually has come out flatly for what it conceives to
55. See App. I infra.
56. The 'Massachusetts cases are collected in App. I infra. See ainu nwtes 25, 2t
supra.
57. Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64 (1863) ; Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 1 71j; Lin-
gle Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Lvan Ast'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 35
(1931).
58. Louisville & N. Ry. v. Webster, 106 Tenn. 86, 61 S. W. 1018 (1901l.
59. See pp. 720-21 infra.
60. It is perhaps with reference to cases claimed to support the Restatement l-
dicta, where the decisions themselves uphold the running uf the covenantq, that the Re-
porter's reliance on precedents seems particularly strained. Thus, ie has claimed: .la-
bama, on the basis of an early weak dictum which at mo~st sh uld iit stand against later
cases; California, without reference to its peculiar statutes; Cvloradv, althijugh there is
no clear holding there of izterparly privily; Indiana. by overlolking the effect of a case
like Conduitt N% Ross, 102 Ind. 166. 26 N. E. 198 (1885), and misinterpreting the holding
in Indianapolis Water Co. v. Nulte, 126 Ind. 373. 26 X. E. 72 (18190), that the ocnefil of
a covenant to maintain a levee built by the promisor on his una land is personal; New
York, by relying on cases now clearly superseded by later decisions; Texas, by citing
only a late lower court dictum (which does not cite Texas cases) at variance with the
general trend of Texas authorities; and so-on. See note 73, and App. I inf ra. It is 2e-
lieved the only dicta properly to be cited for the Repurter's pjsition are cases frm Rhode
Island for section 82(a) and from Missouri and Nebraska fur sectk.n 82(b).
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be the English rule of nontransferability of affirmative covenants."' Cer-
tainly this state, and others assuming to follow a like rule, 2 cannot be
cited in favor of either or both branches of section 82. Also to be omitted
are certain jurisdictions where the law has been made uncertain by stat-
ute; ' 3 thus, California has the unusual situation of just the converse of
clause (b), namely, the rule that a covenant cannot run unless it is made
separate and apart from a conveyance-a rule fully as sensible as clause
(b). 4
Turning to the other side of the picture, we find a number of cases
which uphold the running of covenants on grounds apart from the exist-
ence of either clause (a) or clause (b)." In addition, there is a con-
siderable amount of dicta criticizing the privity doctrines 00 and of de-
cisions determined without reference to these doctrines at all.07 It is sub-
mitted that all this body of judicial authority is of substantial importance
since the problem, looked at from this point of view, is in essence to prove
a negative, that is, that many courts actually have not been worried about
the supposed compulsion of the restrictions." The Reporter, however,
61. Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913), L. R. A. 1918E 222. See
discussion of New York cases in App. I infra.
62. Various jurisdictions have been cited as not permitting the running of the burden
of affirmative covenants. Cf. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 850; Sims, op.
cit. supra note 28, at 166, 167. But it seems clear that included, in addition to New York,
are at most England, New Jersey, and Virginia. Even in these jurisdictions the author-
ity is not too persuasive. In England, where there are considerable dicta and the text
writers have been very decided, the cases are more, as is stated in the leading case of
Austerberry v. Oldham, 29 Ch. D. 750 (C. A. 1885), of the "semble" variety. See authori-
ties cited CLaxRK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 113, 146, 158. The few American cases state
the clearer alternative ground of invalidity of the noncompetition covenants as in restraint
of trade. Brewer v. Marshall, 18 N. J. Eq. 337 (1867), 19 N. J. Eq. 537 (1868); Costigan
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 54 N. J. L. 233, 23 AtI. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1892) ; Tardy v. Creasy, 81
Va. 553 (1886) ; cf. note 35 =rpra.
63. In addition to California, note 64 infra, see Farmers & Merchants Irrig, Co.
v. Hill, 90 Neb. 847, 134 N. W. 929 (1912).
64. The California rule is stated at length in App. I infra.
65. As pointed out in note 73 in!ra, it is believed that the decisions of 15 states cited
in App. I infra, really support the running of covenants contrary to the views of tile Re-
statement, and that the decisions of 10 other states are on the whole more consistent with
such support than with the Restatement.
66. Among such cases in App. I infra, may be cited Reidsville & S. E. R. R. v.
Baxter, 13 Ga. App. 357, 363, 79 S. E. 187, 190 (1913) ; Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H.
475 (1869) ; Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1, 13, 14 (1870) ; McCormick v. Stoneheart,
195 S. V. 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) ; 165 Broadway Bldg., Inc. v. City Investing Co.,
120 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 682 (1941).
67. Examples from among the cases cited in App. I in!ra, might include Sexauer v.
Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N. W. 941 (1907) (fencing covenant) ; Rugg v. Lemley, 78
Ark. 65, 93 S. W. 570 (1906) (party-wall covenant) ; and Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F. (2d) 908
(C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
68. As to the burden of proof here, see note 54 supra.
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casts this body of authority aside on the ground that the dicta are un-
persuasive and that the cases cited can all be distinguished away as ac-
tually complying with either one or the other of the two catch-all branches
of section 82. This convenient way of getting rid of authorities naturally
leaves not a great number remaining since not often (never where the
lawyer is sophisticated enough at least to cause the exchange of cross-
deeds) will a, covenant be made where search will not discover at least
some sort of slight interest, either already existing or created by the
covenant agreement, to which the covenant may now by late rationalizatio n
be said to be attached. For example, if one enters into an agreement to
pay for water rights, obviously he must have either had those rights be-
fore, thus satisfying clause (a) of 82, or received them as a part of the
covenant, thus satisfying clause (b) of that section.69 (Of course, even
these covenants are still expected to run the more distressing hurdle of
section 85.)
Even so, there is still left an irreducible minimum of judicial opinion
which cannot be so rejected. ° Perhaps hardest to distinguish away
are the cases where the burden of a covenant has been allowed to run
while the benefit is personal or in gross, such as the burden to pay a share
of the construction expense of a party wall to the original builder, when-
ever the wall is used." These cases certainly cannot be brought under
section 85; nor do they even fit properly under section 82 since the prom-
69. The cases of running covenants for the adjustment of water rights cited in App. I
infra, seem almost as numerous as those of party-wall covenants or covenants to repair
or fence. See, e.g., Bolles v. Pecos Irrig. Co., 23 N. M. 32, 167 Pac. 230 (1917) ; Horn
v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 AUt. 706, 9 L. R. A. 810 (1690) ; Adamson v. Black Rock
Power & Irrig. Co., 297 Fed. 905 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), cert. denicd, 26 U. S. 630
(1925) ; Ball v. Rio Grande Canal Co., 256 S. WN. 67 (Tex:. Civ. App. 1923); Farmers'
High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 40, 92
Pac. 290 (1907) ; and others in App. I infra. Against these simple and desirable results,
the harsh conclusions of Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. 459 ('Mass. 1837), and Lingle Water
Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931),
stand out.
70. In addition to the cases cited in note 71 infra, the following are important cases
which the Reporter overlooks: Bald Eagle Valley R. R. v. Nittany Valley R. R., 171 Pa.
284, 33 Ati. 239 (1895) ; Moseby v. Roche, 233 Ala. 20, 171 So. 351 (1936); Did: v.
Sears-Roebuck & Co., 115 Conn. 122, 160 Ail. 432 (1932); Mueller v. Bankers' Trint
Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N. W. 103 (1933); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. V. State,
275 S. IV. 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); American Strawboard Co. v. Haldeman Paper
Co., 83 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897). Of course, the usual and freely running covenants
for party walls or irrigation are really not distinguishable; the attempted rationalization
that a single covenant is at once an easement and a running promise is an artificial and
labored attempt to justify what the courts permit without hesitation. Indeed, it is argued
in (1908) 8 CO. L. REv. 121, that party-wall covenants must be held personal 1
71. Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 199, 3 N. E. 282 (1885) ; Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind.
166, 26 N. E. 198 (1885); Pillsbury v. Morris, 54 Minn. 492, 56 N. W. 170 (1S93);
Hill v. City of Huron, 33 S. D. 324, 145 N. NV. 570 (1914). See also Cool: v. Paul, 4 Neb.
Unof. 93, 93 N. W. 430 (1903) ; Adams v. Noble, 120 Mich. 545, 79 N. IV. 810 (1899) ;
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isee's interest is personal. The Reporter has suggested as to these cases
that they must be considered either as based on quasi-contractual principles
or as erroneous. Obviously they are not in the quasi-contractual category
because the courts frankly enforce the contracts according to their terms.
And no reason is perceived why a simple contract to reimburse a man
for his expenditures in this way as soon as the wall is later used should
be considered improper. These and other cases, such as those involving
water rights or other use of land, seem rather clearly in point, notwith-
standing they have been ignored by the Reporter.
72
If, therefore, we are to be governed by a mere count of noses, rather
than arguments of policy and social need,' the count nonetheless goes
against the Reporter on either branch of section 82 separately and clearly
on both branches when joined together." Here further consideration
should be given the Lingle case from Wyoming, the case so important
Fowler v. Koehler, 43 App. D. C. 349 (1915) ; Gavit, Covenants Runninq 1"ith the Land
(1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 786, 799. While these cases are dialectically so important [as
being so completely opposed to section 85 and at least to clause (a) of 82, and in real
substance to clause (b) J, yet they do not represent the usual type of party-wall agreement,
for there the parties desire both benefit and burden to run and the courts freely permit
this; see the many cases cited in App. I infra, and notes 5 and 6 supra. See also cases
collected in Aigler, The Rwnning With the Land of Agreenents to Pay for a Portion of
the Cost of Party-Walls (1912) 10 MICH. L. REv. 187. Several states now have statutes
to this effect. See Isaacs, Statutory Party Walls (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. Rhv. 229; Cor-
dill v. Israel, 130 La. 138, 57 So. 778 (1912).
72. See note 69 and p. 719 supra.
73. A fair count of the showing made by the cases in App. I hinra, is believed to
result as follows: for section 82(a), one jurisdiction, Massachusetts, and dicta from
another, Rhode Island (certain dicta in other cases, e.g.. Alabama, being overshadowed
by later or more important cases from the same state) ; for section 82(b), three, and
possibly four, states, Maine, Nevada, Wyoming, and Tennessee, and dicta from Mis-
souri and Nebraska. None can be cited for section 85, unless the Massachusetts cases
are again considered authority for clause (a) of 85. Against these, on the basis of
present holdings, should be cited Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. Some of these are claimed by the Reporter, but
it is not believed that his claims can be sustained. See note 60 supra. In the following
jurisdictions the indications may be less strong, but there is nothing inconsistent in any
one of them with the eventual adoption of a rule against interparty privity; all sustain
covenants of this sort: Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wisconsin. It is true that the Reporter claims these cases
as generally supporting his view by small distinctions of the kind discussed above; thus, in
the New Hampshire case, where Massachusetts privity was strongly criticized, there was
acceptance of a deed poll, and so on. There are eight states where no cases have been
found (these surely cannot be counted as favoring restraints) ; two, Delaware and South
Carolina, where the only cases appear to hold the covenants personal on clear-cut grounds;
one, California, with a special statutory rule; and three, New Jersey, New York, and
Virginia, which more or less definitely follow the rule that no burden runs. It is sub-
mitted that there can be no doubt that the "weight of authority" is against the Reporter.
And if results be looked at, they are literally overwhelming; omitting the special situa-
tions of California, Massachusetts, and New York, they show 88 cases where the cove-
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to the Reporter's thesis. 4 This case involved a covenant, attached to a
transfer of irrigation water rights, to pay certain annual (operation and
maintenance charges, together with annual assessments of the s original
cost over a ten-year period. The covenant was stated to run with the land.
The annual charges were actually small; the court below gave judgment
of about $2,000 for five years of arrears. The appellate court quite
properly reversed this judgment since the trial court, contrary to settled
precedent, had assessed against the present landholder all deficiencies in
payment, including accruals against former owners7 5 The court did nit
stop there, however, but in a rather lengthy ,pinit on went on to hold that
the obligation of the covenant as a whole could n, it be attached to the
transfer.
Several questions arise as to the learned opinion. It purports to rely
largely upon English legal history, but gives only general references tol
secondary sources which have not considered this subject in detail; it fails
to note modern researches in and discussions of that legal history, as well
as modern text comment on the rule; the authorities relied on are not
recent; and the opinion fails to distinguish between Massachusetts privity
and privity by way of deed. Perhaps it is for one or more of these reasons
that the surprising result is reached of invalidating a coimparatively simple
and desirable arrangement of a kind which is quite regularly enforced
and may be supported even under the stricter views of the Massachusetts
decisions.3 One wonders how irrigation can be developed in the arid parts
of the West if a decision of this kind must obtain generally. Possibly tht
most interesting thing of all is to note that this covenant could easily have
been rationalized as satisfying either branch of section 82; indeed, had
the case gone the other way. the Reporter would certainly have distin-
guished it away as of no consequence. For the covenant itself definitely
created and conveyed water rights, and the covenant was clearly an aid
to the easement or profit thus created.7
In concluding this survey of the authorities (for further details of
which the reader must be referred to the first appendix), it is necessary
nants ran in such manner as the parties wished. 11 Iwhere the cuovenants \.ere held per-,,nal
either on clearly acceptable grounds or on the more debated, but arguable, gruund, nute 35
supra, that a covenant not to compete is in restraint of trade, but oly 5 where running
was refused. Even if the three special states be added, we find that many ctnnt,
actually do run in California and New York; it is only in Nlasachu~etts wvhere trans-
fer is quite strictly limited, and even there the restriction is stmewhat jffset by de elgp-
ment of the "affirmative easement."
74. Lingle Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Lban As'n, 43 WV.u. 41, 297
Pac. 385 (1931).
75. See C.x. loc. cit. s upra note 6; Union Trust Co. of 'Md. v. Rosenburg, 171 'Md.
409, 189 At. 421 (1937); Conti v. Duve, 142 Pa. Super. 16'), 15 A. (2d) 414 1941Jt,
(1941) S9 U. oF PA. L. R,. 396.
76. Compare, e.g.. Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1837).
77. Compare notes 69, 70 supra, based on these eases.
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to touch upon two matters often referred to in this discussion, namely,
ancient legal history and the views of commentators. With respect to the
former, there is little doubt that here much pseudolegal history has
masqueraded as real with hampering effect."8 When one goes back to the
Year Book sources, one finds the enforcement of covenants of the general
type here considered, especially with the use of the writ de fine facto, with-
out any question of validity; and there seems no doubt but that these in-
terests were considered land interests and transferable as such.79 It is
amusing therefore to note all the excitement which the famous Pakenlham's
Case"° has aroused. Here was a case where a covenant by a prior to sing in
a chapel was held to pass without any question being raised by counsel or
by the court; and since this result has not fitted in with later concepts of
what should have been the history, it has been necessary to find all sorts
of reasons for condemning the authority of that case as inconsiderable
or as dicta or otherwise."' Actually this history dates only from the.chance
and unsubstantiated remark of the reactionary Lord Kenyon in 1789 in
the case cited, and from this a whole history has developed. For his
part the writer would not urge conclusions from the Year Book cases too
strongly in support of the theory he holds proper since it really should
be doubtful how far we can judge our course by what was done in feudal
England seven or eight centuries ago. But he feels that it is highly im-
proper to misstate history and to use the misstated history as a claimed
basis for tying the hands of modern courts and judges.8 3
78. Compare Bordwell, English Property Reform and its American Aspects (1927)
37 YALE L. J. 1, 18, 20; Bordwell, Book Review (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 838, 839; Holds-
worth, Book Review (1930) 46 L. Q. REv. 364; Walsh, Book Review (1929) 7 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 220; Chafee, Book Review (1929) 43 HAV. L. Rv. 334; Roberts, Book
Review (1929) 18 Ky. L. J. 96.
79. See the several important cases, particularly those in the 1200's, showing the
enforcement of the running of the burden of covenants through the writ to enforce a
fine, in CLARK, op. cit. sipra note 6, at 103-07.
80. Y. B. 42 Edw. III, 3, pl. 14 (1368); cf. Woodbine, Pakeniam's Case (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 775. For some of the discussions, see CLARK, op. cit. smapra note 6, at 102,
103; ef. authorities cited in note 85 infra.
81. The case, so far as it goes (no judgment was entered), shows that the court was
prepared to enforce a running covenant in an action of covenant without a grant or deed
and without an easement between the original parties.
82. Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639 (K. B. 1789).
83. Before Webb v. Russell, in 1789, the objectors have not been able to find a case
enforcing such a requirement; and, as noted above, there are definite Year Book cases
the other way. Some attempt has been made to rest upon the preamble to the Statute
of Leases, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34 (1540), stating that statutory reform was needed to pro-
vide for the enforcement of covenants in leases made by the monasteries lately seized by
the king; but this rationalization of the king's needs is clearly unreliable, 7 HOLDSWORrfI,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1937) 288. A statutory preamble with a definite
purpose is hardly a place in which to find an accurate legal and historical survey of three
or four centuries.
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As to the commentators whose views have been suggested as sufficiently
considerable to constitute a ground for the Restatement apart from the
decisions, 4 it is true that some authors, such as encyclopedia and general
property text writers, have made confused references to the decisions re-
ferred to earlier." It is not surprising that a confusion which has crept
into the cases should be repeated in texts which have not been prepared
from a highly analytical or careful point of view. That there were other
views at the same time has already appeared from the references to
Holmes."6 It is surprising, however, that apparently no consideration is
here given to the large and informed amount of modern comment, prac-
tically all highly critical of this doctrine and practically all following the
approach for which this writer has contended."7 It is a truism that these
most careful and analytical comments of modern times are usually to be
found in the law reviews. During the last twenty years the law reviews
have considered this subject quite extensively, and yet these writings ap-
pear to have been totally ignored in this discussion.
One further reference should be made to section 85. Since, as indicated,
no authority has been cited for it and since none has been found fairly
or reasonably supporting it, its history here in connection with the prec-
edents must necessarily be brief. But it should be made quite clear to
the reader that it is but parading under the ancient and well authenticated
doctrine of "touching and concerning." That doctrine was settled in 1583
by the famous Spencer's Case,"8 which held that a covenant to run must
84. By an Adviser, App. II infra.
85. Hare & Wallace's Notes to Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q. B.
1583), 1 SMITH's LEAunNG CASES (5th Am. ed.) 115, 139, 140; 19 Am. & E::o. E:c. or
LAw 973, 998-1004; 21 C. J. S. § 84; THOu-PsoN ON RE..L PRorenry (Perm. Wd.) § 3629;
ef. 3 TIFFA-qy, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 851, where the conclusiuns are mure hesi-
tantly stated than in earlier editions.
86. See note 2 supra. See also 4 Kx.wr, Co..m. (12th ed. 1873, Holmes ed.) 40, n. 1;
RAwLE. COVENANTS FOR TITLE (5th ed. 1887) 294, n. 2; Darling, Is a Sublease for the
Residue of a Lessee's Term in Effect an Assignment? (188-) 16 Ait. L REv. 16, 39-42;
POLLOCa, PRINCIPLES OF CoNTRAcr (11th ed. 1942) 192, n. 76. McFee, Privity of Estato
(1886) 20 Am. L. Rv. 389, 411, after struggling with the concept, concludes that the in-
tricacy, contradiction, and confusion in the application of the term were the result of
expressing totally different ideas of policy by the one phrase "privity of estate."
87. These are too numerous to cite exhaustively. The following are typical: (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 821, collecting modem authorities; (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1187; (1927) 37
YALE L. J. 125; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 911; (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1056, 1064; (1933) 18
B. U. L. REv. 764; (1940) 28 CALIF. L. REV. 769; (1933) 11 Cni-KEN: REv. 122; (1938)
38 COi. L. REV. 1299; (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 404; (1933) 19 Cora;. L. Q. 145; (1938)
24 CoN. L. Q. 133; (1938) 7 FoRDHA.m L. REv. 462; (1923) 21 Mfcn. L. Rv 593;
(1923) 7 MixN. L. REv. 489; (1938) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 164; (1927) 5 Tex. L. REv.
197; (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 646. But compare (1926) 39 HI-v. L. REv. 507; (1927) 4
Vis. L. REV. 125, questioning certain cases approved in this article. See discussion by
Gavit, Coveenants Running lWith the Land (1930) 24 ILL. L. REV. 786, 793, and in Restric-
tie Covenants in iev York (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 93.
88. 5 Co. 16a, 16b, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (Q. B. 1583).
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"touch or concern the thing demised," and not be merely collateral to the
land, as where a lessee covenanted to build a house upon other than the
leased land of the lessor or to pay a collateral sum to the lessor or to a
stranger.
Following this case, the general view has been that the problem con-
cerns the nature of the promise, and the intimate connection of the prom-
ise with the land itself has been consistently emphasized ever since."0 In
a famous article " Dean Bigelow analyzed the cases and pointed out that
the test is in effect the measuring of the legal relations of each party with
reference to the land itself. If the promisor's legal privileges and other
relations in the land are restricted or lessened by the promise, it touches
and concerns the land as to him. And if the promisor's legal relations are
increased or made more valuable in the land, the benefit of the covenant
touches or concerns that land as to him." The rule, of course, expresses
the rational concept that a promise passing with land must be one which
concerns the land and that merely some purely personal adjustment be-
tween the parties will not be assumed by a new purchaser of the land."'
The question, therefore, is entirely as to the kind of promise and not the
relationship of the two parties to each other or a balancing off of one
against the other, as required by section 85. That section concerns an
entirely different thing, a kind of jural nexus which binds A and B to-
gether with respect to land and provides that A's interest shall not out-
weigh B's and vice versa. It is superimposed upon, and not a part of,
89. The cases are, of course, numerous: of those cited in App, I infra, perhaps
the case of Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S. C. 308, 181 S. E. 66, 102 A. L.
R. 773 (1935), illustrates the point as well as any; there a covenant to move a mill else-
where and furnish power was held intended to be personal. That circumstances may prop-
erly alter results is shown by comparing a case such as Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Gean, 186
Ark. 573, 55 S. W. (2d) 63 (1932) (where a covenant to furnish domestic gas, with no
premises mentioned, was held personal), with cases upholding the running of similar
covenants to supply particular premises. Johnson v. American Gas Co., 8 Ohio App.
124 (1917) ; Parks v. Hines, 68 S. W. (2d) 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), aff'd, Hines v.
Parks, 128 Tex. 289, 96 S. W. (2d) 970 (1936).
90. See Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases (1914) 12 Micu. L. R'v. 639,
(1914) 30 L. Q. REv. 319.
91. This test has often been approved, as by the court in Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N. Y. 248, 15 N. E. (2d) 793 (1938),
and in 165 Broadway Bldg., Inc. v. City Investing Co., 120 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 682 (1941), and by Aigler, Comment, The Content of Cove-
nants in Leases (1919) 17 MIcH. L. REv. 93. It is rejected sub silentio by this Restate-
ment.
92. Some question has occasionally been raised as to whether money payments can be
considered as other than personal; but the numerous cases herein cited, and the reason
of the situation, make it clear that payments for the direct benefit of land held are as
closely connected therewith as any other contractual duties. See discussion, CLARIK, Op.
cit. supra note 6, at 76-79; (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 404, 405.
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the rule that the covenant must touch and concern the land and be not
merely collateral to it. 3
WHY THE RESTATEMENT Is As IT IS
If, as is believed to be clear, the authorities do not justify the com-
plicated setup of the Restatement, how does it happen that it has so per-
sisted, in spite of all criticisms, as the law behind which the Institute is
determined to stand? The answer to that question, the most interesting
and instructive part of this whole history, is not at all in doubt. Indeed,
to any one familiar with the cardinal principle of the Institute, that a
determined and expert Reporter shall lead the congregation into unan-
imity of belief, the answer is surely known before this case history is
studied. Either the Reporter gets his way or there is no restatement, only
a deadlock. And the whole business at hand is to produce a restatement.
The only unusual element in this particular case history is that we find
all the ordinary elements here in heightened form.
Hence we must say-and it is, indeed, a compliment to a teacher of
courage and fortitude to say-that this Restatement is a monument to
the enduring persistence of the Reporter. Had he not had a well-nigh
obsessive belief that a certain kind, and a certain kind only, of covenants
was so bad a thing, so harsh to poverty-stricken landowners, that it must
be struck down, no matter what the cost, and had he not followed the
path pointed out by that belief without permitting the slightest deviation,
the course of this history would have been different. The fact that he
was gifted with an attractive and agreeable personality which cloaked an
unusual strength of character and that he deservedly had a wide circle of
warm personal friends necessarily made his declarations as to the case law
carry unusual strength, even beyond the well-nigh impregnable position
which the Institute customarily accords its Reporters. The writer does
not criticize the Reporter; why should he not take advantage of a heaven-
sent opportunity to put over his views, just as other Reporters have done
before him? But had he countenanced any departure from the rule of
practical inalienability which he had in mind, it is obvious that it would
have been quickly accepted, in view of the general dubiety of the Insti-
tute members as to these restrictions and the modern view of free alien-
ability of property interests.
93. The binding of land to land seems to be quite clear from the e-xpress words of
section 85, see discussion p. 711 swpra, and was so understood by the Advisers in voting
upon it. See App. II infra. Consider, for example, the important series of party-wall cases
for the payment of part of the cost of a party wall when used (which, it is well settled,
"touches and concerns" land) which may still run when the benefit is personal, see note
71 si,.pra. These obviously cannot satisfy the requirements of either clause (a) or clause
(b) of 85.
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The commanding position of the Reporter to any Restatement has been
well-recognized. Professor Max Radin puts it with his usual facility
when he speaks of a doctrine as "enshrined in the summary of Williston
on Contracts which is called the Restatement." " Professor Beale's domi-
nance of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws has produced a whole
legal literature." So, one might call the roll of the great names which
carry their respective formulations of the law. That this must be the
result should be rather obvious. Unless the Reporter himself will yield
his views to others (a tolerance not characteristic of the scholarly mind),
the central administration of the Institute must get behind his views in
order that a restatement be forthcoming, and thereafter the administration
party is naturally strong enough to carry the matter through to a con-
clusion. The writer has served as Adviser on Property in one branch or
another of the subject practically since the formation of the Institute;
and while he has seen many sharp differences of opinion, he knows of no
instance where the views of the Reporter, persisted in, did not prevail.
An Adviser, if he is shrewd, soon realizes that it is arrant foolishness for
him to look up, or get convictions about, the authorities; it is the wiser
course to confine his attention to improvements of form, while he is mean-
while absorbing desirable instruction and information in his chosen field
under pleasant vacation auspices.
90
Hence the only aspect in which this Restatement can be considered novel
is that the trends apparent in the other Restatements appear here in so ac-
centuated a form. For here we have a subject more caviar than usual
to the general, a result which is more bold in extending doubtful and
overlapping lines of cases into a completely novel structure of prohibition
than any other Institute product, and an unusually uncompromising ad-
herence to a policy of outlawing parties' bargainings contrary to the trend
of modern legal thinking. There is, however, perhaps one difference,
which, if it does exist, is of much importance. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that the result here was more a creature of chance than in the
other cases. Of course, the views of Williston, Beale, Bohlen, and the
others were well-known through their writings; and it could naturally be
expected that their Restatements would follow their views. But Professor
94. See Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will (1943) 43 COL. L. REV. 575.
95. CooK, loc. cit. supra note 51, is, of course, only the latest of well-nigh a multi-
tude of articles and even books which have resulted.
96. Since, therefore, the conferences in general are so limited to details of form, they
are necessarily both dull and time-consuming. And the resulting draftsmanship not merely
is not worth the great expense involved, but tends to become crabbed to meet the formal
-if not the substantive-suggestions of several minds. It justifies the comment of Pol-
lock to Holmes: "I have not seen the later versions of the re-stated law of Contract, but
doubt whether the promoters have an adequate draftsman among them. Crabbed and
obscure definitions are of no use beyond a narrow circle of students, of whom probably
every one has a pet one of his own." 2 HOLmrFs-Pouoclc Lzrraus (Howe ed. 1941) 233.
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Rundell, the Reporter for Servitudes, though a well-recognized property
teacher, had not written on the subject; and certainly it was a distinct
surprise to the writer, and doubtless to others, to find as the work pro-
ceeded just what his convictions were and how strong they were. Of
course, it is possible that the Director did know of these views and that
they facilitated the choice, although, as far as is known, the Director him-
self took no position in the dispute until after the lines had been formed
last spring. The indications are that when the work in the property
field was expanded and distributed among several groups to hasten its
completion, the actual distribution of parts among several Reporters was
more or less by chance (or perhaps by agreement among the gentlemen
involved) and not by very deliberate choice. The result with which we
are thus faced is presumably, therefore, unusually adventitious.
This case history will not be complete and, indeed, some of its more
important teachings will be lost if some more detailed account of the treat-
ment accorded minority views is not outlined. Here the writer finds him-
self in somewhat of a dilemma, for he knows too much about this history
to be the best of historians. "All of this I saw; some of it I was." He
took an active part in that minority, which constantly threatened to be,
if it was not actually, a majority; and there is danger that documentation
will seem to the reader as overmuch personal history, rather than the
chronicle of ordinary Institute procedure which is intended. Once again,
therefore, the expedient has been hit upon of stating the matter only sum-
marily at this point, leaving the supporting data to the less obtrusive posi-
tion of a second appendix to this article.
For present purposes it may be emphasized that the question of inter-
party privity was the one big issue which divided the Reporter and his
Advisers from the beginning. Indeed, after several conferences, all the
Advisers present at a conference in September, 1941, agreed to the elim-
ination of the provision. But the Reprorter maintained his position in his
next draft, and it was then agreed that the issue should go to the Council
for settlement. When, however, it came before the Council in February,
1943, because of haste of printing or other mischance, the dissent was
not stated, and it was orally reported that the Advisers were in agreement
as to the then section 5, present section 82, except for one who wanted
to change the existing law! So the Council voted approval of section 82,
though it returned section 85 as unintelligible, being presumably mis-
printed. Reconsideration being asked, the Advisers then voted by a majori-
ty of one to sustain section 82, and by a considerable majority to eliminate
section 85.' s Thereafter, the Executive Committee, after hearing the Re-
porter and the writer, voted unanimously for the elimination of section 85
97. App. II, pp. 737-38 infra.
98. The reasons given by the various Advisers are summarized in App. II infra.
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and took no formal action as to section 82 (thus allowing it to stand), al-
though just half of those present, outside of the officers, expressed grave
doubt about it. Unfortunately, this was reported to the Council as unani-
mous support of the Committee for section 82." Thereafter the Council,
with the Reporter, but no representative of the minority view, present,
voted to sustain both sections 82 and 85; though it is understood that the
majority for clause (b) of 85 was "slight." 100 And the Annual Meeting,
after a brief debate which showed many of the members rather disturbed
about the situation, but impressed by "the, weight of authority," voted
favorably upon section 82 and clause (a) of 85; and after a series of
parliamentary maneuvers, it voted down motions both for the approval
and disapproval of clause (b) and finally referred the whole matter back
to the Reporter for another year and without recommendation as to that
clause. This action has since been described as "approval" of the Report-
er's position. 1' There seems little doubt that the officers consider the Re-
porter's position to have been sustained or that they contemplate the re-
reference as more for the purpose of polishing the form of statement than
for making any change of substance.
Even so summary a statement shows the continuing doubt of many
scholars and distinguished men as to the result; but it cannot show fully
how decisive in resolving votes, if not doubts, was the Reporter's con-
tinued insistence that the cases compelled the result.' 2 Moreover, it points
to a curious and really quite disturbing reaction towards minority views,
which is not so much a willful desire to suppress such views as a complete
failure to appreciate that they may exist, at least after the Reporter has
finally spoken. Thus, as to the contretemps of the original presentation
of the material to the Council in February, 1943, the officers have re-
peatedly said that they thought in good faith the Advisers were in accord
as stated; and all other circumstances point to the truth of that conviction,
even in the face of the importance of the problem and the long history
of division as to it.10 3 Such a conviction as to their work is dangerous
(even more so when honestly, and therefore firmly, held) both to the
fluid growth of our law and to the encouragement of clear and straight
and independent thinking upon the part of the various constituent mem-
bers of our profession.
99. See App. II infra.
100. See Report of Annual Meeting, not yet published, but referred to in App, II
infra.
101. By Judge Goodrich, cf. note 53 supra; also by the Director in correspondence.
102. It was clearly decisive as to the vote of the Advisers and the Executive Com-
mittee on section 82; it was probably decisive at the Council and the Annual Meeting in
May, 1943.
103. Compare, also, the report that the members of the Executive Committee were
unanimous as to section 82, or that the Annual Meeting approved clause (b) of 85. It
would seem that the fact of division is unconsciously or subconsciously rejected.
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PERORATION AND PROGNOSIS
Does this tale have any moral? And what is the future of real covenants
likely to be after the dynamiting they are about to suffer at the hands of
America's leading sciolists in law? Legal prophecy is always dangerous,
but it is fascinating and occasionally helpful. Let us try to look ahead.
Those of us who have had occasion to make use of the Restatements
somewhat extensively realize that the complete product finds its greatest
usefulness as a jumping-off point for the beginning of discussion. The
Restatements are easy and graceful citations upon settled points;""4 but
rarely, if ever, do they point the way out of a dispute or through a morass.
American lawyers and judges like to be shown and convinced; and since
the supporting grounds are carefully eliminated from the Restatements,
they do not contain the material to persuade.'0  One must resort to the
detailed writings of scholars, and, of course, especially of the various
Reporters where they are available, for the arguments and supporting
data which will point to eventual decision.""
One may, therefore, doubt whether the Institute will be more success-
ful here in confining the law within the narrow channels proposed than
in other instances. True, an opportunity for clarification and exposition
of a troubled corner of the law has unfortunately been lost, but never-
theless that law will probably still keep on its way much as before, even
though it remains muddy, ill-defined, and confused. Probably, therefore,
very few more covenants will be actually held invalid as a result of thi
Restatement than had been held so before. Of course, where a court is
already in doubt, this may operate to swing the balance against the cove-
nant, but more often it will at most help to some rationalization of an
already achieved result.
This may not be quite the case, however, as to one branch of the sub-
ject, where the Restatement may have effects more decisive. That is in
the business of searching and guaranteeing titles. The gentlemen working
in this field must naturally be fearful of any matters which suggest doubts
about existing titles. The Restatement gives free play to all their possible
doubts. One might expect them to regard it favorably as a stimulating
factor for their business, except that, as the writer knows them, they are
likely to be more upset by the fact of uncertainty than pleased by the
104. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 42 YAI.E L. J. 643.
105. This has been so often stated in critical articles that there is no need to retrace
this ground again.
106. Thus, Judge Goodrich, in his Annual Report of Adviser on Professional Rcla-
tions (1940) 17 A. L. I. REP'. 50, 59, referred appreciatively to the fact that the writer had
cited the Restatement of Torts in Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F. (2d) 1S3 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1939). Of course, the writer has cited the Restatements several times; he is
glad to do so where possible. But the case referred to well illustrates the point. The
Restatement offered a graceful point of take-off-but when it came to a consideration of
the really decisive issues, resort to law review articles was necessary for enlightenment.
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possibility of finding their business enlarged. At any rate, on the basis
of the Restatement a title searcher will be quite justified in refusing to
pass as sound any titles wherein these horrible encumbrances of affirma-
tive covenants are suggested.
107
But on the whole, one need regret less the possible turn of development
which may be given to a particular legal subject than the attitude to-
wards both the science and the art of law which is reflected in the Insti-
tute's work as here set forth. After all, what impresses one most about
this whole affair is what, with the utmost deference, can be viewed only
as the intellectual shoddiness of the whole affair. The writer can accept
with comparative equanimity a statement that either this or that clear-cut
rule is the desirable policy and the most supported by the authorities. But
it is a different matter to accept a complicated jerry-built structure whose
very complications can be justified only as an attempt to catch differing
and mutually conflicting precedents to a result which certainly as a whole,
if not in various of its parts, does not exist anywhere, though it may tend
indirectly to support preconceived notions of policy. That seems to this
writer at least a deviousness unworthy of our profession. Lawyers are
jealous of both their prerogatives and their capacities to lead. How can
they be expected to preserve the respect of the general populace if they
take such indirect methods to a goal, no matter how desirable that goal
may be?
Of course, the problem presented by such a restatement to the individual
members of the Institute is not an easy one, and one must sympathize with
their predicament. What are they to do with a document thus offered for
their approval preparatory to issuance as representing their best collective
judgment? Particularly must one sympathize with those members who are
earnestly desiring more light. It is obvious, however, that the adminis-
tration program must go through and that doubts and qualms of indi-
vidual members may in the long run be permitted no actual effect in chang-
ing the course of events. The real question is how far a legal document
which does not and cannot represent the considered expert and informed
view of other than a few named individuals can properly stand as the
authentic voice of the profession.
107. Of course, there is always the disturbing thought, stated so trenchantly by Mfc-
Dougal, that we are dealing only with the backwater of vital modern property in these
Restatements anyhow. See McDougal, Book Reviews (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1502, (1941)
54 HAiv. L. REv. 526; and McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus
Clarification and Reform (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1077. See also Lasswell and MeDougal,
Legal Education md Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest (1943)
52 YALE L. J. 203, and his views on the proper teaching of Property, 1941 HANDDR. Ass'N
Am. L. SCHOOLS 268.
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APPENDIX I. AMERICAN PRIVITY CASES *
Alabama. Moseby v. Roche, 233 Ala. 280, 171 So. 351 (1936) (bn. of c. by beach
owner not to use his own property for bathing parties or any c'.mmercial use runs; need
not be in a deed); Cummings v. Alexander, 233 Ala. 10, 169 So. 310 (1936) (bt. of c.
to pay mortgage-in a separate instrument from a deed of conveyance--runs); Gilmer
v. Mobile & M. Ry., 79 Ala. 569, 574 (1885) (bn. of c. in deed of right of -way to railroad
to stop trains near promisee's house runs; the court said that while well-considered cases
hold "the common ligament, the estate charged," enough, there was certainly sufficient
privity here in view of the easement) ; cf. Mobile & M. Ry. v. Gilmer, S5 Ala. 422, 5 So.
138 (1888) ; Leek -. Meeks, 199 Ala. S9, 74 So. 31 (1916) (bn. and bt. of party-v.all C.
run).
Arkansas. Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Gean, 186 Ark. 573, 55 S. AV. (2d) 63 (1932) (c.
that "all gas used by grantors for domestic use' be free of charge was personal; no
premises mentioned or reference to "assigns"); Rugg v. Lemley, 78 Ark. 65, 93 S. V.
570 (1906) (bt. and bn. of party-wall c. run); Bank of Hoxie v. Meriwether, 1C5 Ark.
39, 265 S. W. 642 (1924) (same); St. Louis, 1. M. & S. Ry. v. Sanders, 91 Ark 153,
121 S. NV. 337 (1909) (bt. of c. to construct levee-apart from a deed-runs).
California. The California cases, which are numerous and are usually cited indis-
criminately, are governed by the Civil Code. CAL. Crv. Copn (Deering, 1941) § 1461 pro-
hibits the running of any c. except as contained in that title, while section 1462 by express
terms provides as to cs. contained in conveyances only for the running of Us. Section
1468-only passed in 1905, after decision of many of the cases usually cited-provides for
somewhat wider running as to cs. made between adjoining landowners. Hence, follow-
ing a close reading of these statutes, the California court holds that the L'w. may not run
when the c. is contained in a conveyance, but may in other cases not contained in a con-
veyance. See Marra v. Aetna Construction Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 375, 101 P. (2d) 490
(1940), and the careful explanation in (1940) 28 C,%'Lw. L. Rrv. 769, 771: "The general
American rule has been criticized as arbitrary and as bearing no relation to the general
policy involved. Its converse in California seems no less arbitrary." Many cases may bz
cited, therefore, which would undoubtedly be upheld on almost any other rule of privity
except this statutory one, e.g., Pedro v. Humboldt County, 217 Cal. 493, 19 P. (2d) 776
(1933) ; Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 117 P. 677 (1911) ; Heimburge v.
State Guaranty Corp., 116 Cal. App. 3M0, 2 P. (2d) 993 (1931) (c. to leave a light well
between property conveyed and grantor's remaining property not upheld); whereas
other cases, such as those involving water rights, have been upheld on various grounds,
as in equity or by way of lien, etc., e.g., Miller & Lux, Inc v. San Joaquin Agricultural
Co., 58 Cal. App. 753, 209 Pac. 592 (1922); Fresno Canal & Irrig. Co. v. Rowell, 139
Cal. 114, 22 Pac. 53 (1889); Fresno Canal & Irrig. Co. v. Dunbar, 30 Cal. 530, 22
Pac. 275 (1889); Chrisman v. Southern California Edison Co., -3 Cal. App. 249, 26
Pac. 618 (1927). See also Burby, Lwid Burdens in California (1931) 4 So. CALIr. L
REv. 343, 354, and (1937) 10 So. CAL1F. L. Rnv. 281, 292.
Colorado. Hottell v. Farmers' Protective Ass'n, 25 Colo. 67, 53 Pac. 327 (1898) (c.
in deed conveying elevator, agreeing to furnish power, runs; the court said that there was
privity of estate-without defining the type of privity involved); Farmers' High Line
Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467, 92 Pac. 290
(1907) [bt. and bn. of c. to furnish wrater for irrigation through a ditch run with the
"easement" of water thus created; references to privity may well mean by succession
only, REsTATFxaST, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § 83].
* The following abbreviations have been used in this appendix: "c." for "covenant
or enforceable agreement"; "bn." for "burden"; "bt." for "benefit."
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Comiecticut. Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 115 Conn. 122, 160 Atl. 432 (1932) (bn,
of c. not to conduct business runs and may be enforced by original promisee).
Delaware. Merchants' Union Trust Co. v. New Philadelphia Graphite Co., 10 Del.
Ch. 18, 83 At. 520 (1912) [bn. of c. in a lease of land by a mortgagor that the lessee
pay part of the rent to the mortgagee does not run, because there is neither privity of
estate, by succession, RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (2) (Proposed Final Draft, 1943) § 83,
or by contract, nor any agency or trust shown].
Florida. Armstrong v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 85 Fla. 126, 95 So. 506 (1922)
(grantee's c. to maintain station held personal, three judges dissenting).
Georgia. Reidsville & Southeastern R. R. v. Baxter, 13 Ga. App. 357, 363, 79 S. E.
187, 190 (1913) [bn. of c. in a deed conveying railroad right of way to construct ware-
house and siding runs; privity unnecessary, citing Tucker v. MeArthur, 103 Ga. 409, 30
S. E. 283 (1898), a warranty case]; Smith v. Gulf Refining Co., 162 Ga. 191, 134 S. E.
446 (1926) (bn. of c. to sell only S. 0. gas passed on conveyance of a term) ; Georgia
S. R. R. v. Reeves, 64 Ga. 492 (1880) (bn. of c. to build a depot enforced; deed poll) ;
Atlanta, K & N. Ry. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S. E. 701 (1906) (bt. and bn. of e.
by purchaser of Water rights to furnish water to covenantee ru!X; no reference to privity
in this and preceding case, only to rule of touching and concerning); Horne v. Macon
Tel. Pub. Co., 142 Ga. 489, 83 S. E. 204 (1914) (party-wall c. runs); Proctor v. Red-
fern, 182 Ga. 175, 185 S. E. 255 (1936) (bn. of c. to make monthly payments runs).
Illiwis. Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 199, 3 N. E. 282 (1885) [bt. of party-wall c. is
personal while bn. runs; cf. Roche v. Ullman, 104 Ill. 11 (1882)]; Natural Products
Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 309 Ill. 230, 140 N. E. 840 (1923) (c. in deed not to
quarry stone runs) ; Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Il. 401, 103 N. E. 194 (1913) (bt. of a nega-
tive restriction may be personal).
Indiana. Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198 (1885) (bn. of a party-wall
c. runs while bt. is personal); Fair Bldg. Co. v. Wineman Realty Co., 87 Ind. App.
520, 156 N. E. 433 (1927) (both bn. and bt. of party-wall c. run) ; Hazlett v. Sinclair,
76 Ind. 488 (1881) (bn. of grantor's c. to fence passed with the adjoining land) ; cf. Mid-
land Ry. v. Fisher, 125 Ind. 19, 24 N. E. 756 (1890), Lake Erie & W. R. R. v. Priest,
131 Ind. 413, 31 N. E. 77 (1892), and Stover v. Harlan, 87 Ind. App. 347, 154 N. E.
882 (1927) (that grantee's c. to fence runs) ; Indianapolis Water Co. v. Nulte, 126 Ind,
373, 376, 26 N. E. 72, 73 (1890) (bt. of c. to maintain a levee built by the promisor on
his own land is personal).
Iowa. Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N. W. 941 (1907) (fencing c. in grant
of land runs; "assigns" not necessary).
Kansas. Southworth v. Perring, 71 Kan. 755, 81 Pac. 481, 82 Pac. 785 (1905) (party-
wall c. runs).
Kentucky. Louisville, A. & P. V. Elect. Ry. v. Whipps, 118 Ky. 121, 80 S. W. 507
(1904), and Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. v. Baskett, 121 S. W. 957 (Ky. 1909) (e, by
grantee of right of way to maintain station runs) ; Swiss Oil Corp. v. Dials, 232 Ky. 298,
22 S. W. (2d) 912 (1929) (royalty c. in oil lease runs; formal dictum that privity is
necessary) ; Ferguson v. Worrall, 125 Ky. 618, 101 S. W. 966 (1907) (party-wall c.
runs).
Maine. Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64 (1868) (unclear, but apparently c. does not run
because made one day after conveyance) ; Lyon v. Parker, 45 Me. 474 (1858) (bt. of c.
to repair does not run).
Maryland. Union Trust Co. v. Rosenburg, 171 Md. 409, 189 At. 421' (1937) (bn. of
c. in a mortgage to pay taxes and assessments runs until privity of estate, i.e., by suc-
cession, ends, the assignee not being liable for breaches before he acquires, or after he
has been divested of, title).
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Massachusetts. Under the peculiar rule of this state of privity by "substituted ten-
ure," discussed in the article above, a c. in aid of an easement, granted fifteen years Mefore,
to draw off water from a mill pond, will run, Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449 (Mass.
1837) ; but there must be at least an easement, or else the c. does not run, Hurd V. Cur-
tis, 19 Pick. 459 (Mass. 1837) ; Wheelock v. Thayer, 16 Pick. tg (Mass. 1834), even if
contained in a deed, Shade v. M. O'Keefe, Inc., 260 Mass. 180, 156 N. E-. S67 (1927);
Orenberg v. Johnston, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N. E. 794 (1929). A party-wall c. runs, Sav-
age .% Mason, 3 Cush. 500 (Mass. 1849), but not a c. to refrain from a certain type of
business, Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946 (1885) (quarrying) ; Shade v.
ML O'Keefe, Inc., supra (grocery business). There can be no running of cs. in gross, as
where the bt. is personal, Lincoln v. Burrage, 177 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 67 (1901) (c. to
pay for party wall) ; Orenberg v. Johnston, supra (c. to maintain tower clock in Har-
vard Church); Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Hinchman, 212 Fed. 813 (C. C. A.
1st, 1914), one judge dissenting, cert. denicd, 239 U. S. 640 (1915), re,,'g 193 Fed. 907
(D. Me. 1912) (c. by a purchaser of mining property to pay for it out of future earn-
ings); or where the bn. is personal, Walsh v. Packard, 165 Mass. 1S9, 42 N. E. 577
(1896) (guaranty of rent). Such needlessly strict disregard of parties' intentions has
been somewhat offset by an unusual recognition of affirmalive casements, as prescriptive
duties to repair a bridge, Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting Co., 1G0 Mass. 267, 35
N. E. 780 (1894), or to pay annual damages for flowage repairs and drawing of water,
Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N. E. 441 (1895), or the "quasi ease-
ment to have fences maintained," as Holmes, J., in Norcross v. James, supra, describes
Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175 (1871). See CLt, .op. cit. supra note 6, at 104. On
this theory the bn. of a c. to pay one-third the expenses of maintaining a side trac: and
taxes has been allowed to run. Everett Factories & Terminal Corp. v. Oldetyme Dis-
tillers Corp., 300 Mass. 499, 15 N. E. (2d) 829 (1938).
Michigan. Mueller v. Bankers' Trust Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N. W. 103
(1933) (c. not in a deed to build a bridge runs-no mention of privity) ; Adams v. Noble,
120 Mich. 545, 79 N. IV. 810 (1899) (bt. and bn. of a party-wall c. run-though parties
may make the bt. personal if they so wish).
Minnesota. Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 14 N. NA% 874 (1833) (bt.
of c. to keep up water level runs); Pillsbury v. Morris, 54 Minn. 492, 56 N. V. 170
(1893) [bn. of party-wall c. runs though bt. is personal; see clear explanation of this
case in Kimm v. Griffin, 67 Minn. 25, 69 N. NV. 634 (1896), both bt. and bn. of party-
wall c. may run]; Kettle River R. R. v. Eastern Ry., 41 Minn. 461, 43 N. AV. 469 (18S9)
(c. to use a certain railroad is personal) ; Pelser v. Gingold, 8 N. V. (2d) 36 ("Jinn.
1943) (c. to pay a personal debt incurred for improvements does not run).
Missouri. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 493, 502 (1885) (party-wall c. created equit-
able easement and runs; dictum that an action at law would fail) ; Robins v. Wright, 331
Mo. 377, 53 S. W. (2d) 1046 (1932) (party-wall c. runs) ; Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v.
Fullen, 114 Mo. App. 633, 91 S. W. 58 (1905) (c. for title runs with mere possession).
Montana. Herigstad v. Hardrock Oil Co., 101 Mont. 22, 52 P. (2d) 171 (1935) (bn.
of c. by assignee of oil prospecting permit to pay contingently on oil production runs).
Nebraska. Farmers & Merchants Irrig. Co. v. Hill, 90 Neb. 847, 134 N. V. 929
(1912) (statute grants a lien for enforcement of irrigation charges and liability on c. is
not personal; dictum that privity of estate necessary) ; Loyal Mystic Legion v. Jones, 73
Neb. 342, 102 N. XV. 621 (1905) (bt. and bn. of party-wall c. run) ; Cook v Paul, 4 Neb.
Unof. 93, 93 N. NV. 430 (1903) (bt. of party-wall c. is personal).
Nevada. Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871) (c. made 6 days after conveyance
cannot run).
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New Hampshire. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475 (1869) (c. to fence runs with
acceptance of deed poll; strong criticism of Massachusetts privity).
New Jersey. Costigan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 54 N. J. L. 233, 23 Atd, 810 (Sup. Ct.
1892) [c. not to claim damages for building railroad construed as personal; also semble
that the bn. of no affirmative c. runs at law, citing English cases and Brewer v. Marshall,
18 N. J. Eq. 337 (1867), 19 N. J. Eq. 537 (1868), c. not to sell marl from other land, i.c,,
not to compete, is illegal and in general restraint of trade; moreover, no affirmative bn.
should run] ; National Union Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N. J. L. 173 (1877) (bt. of c.
not to conduct a banking business runs).
New Mexico. Bolles v. Pecos Irrig. Co., 23 N. M. 32, 167 Pac. 280 (1917) (c.
to furnish irrigation runs to and against successors) ; Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F. (2d) 908
(C. C. A. 8th, 1925) (c. in deed to pump water' to reservoir on land conveyed runs).
New York. After almost hopeless confusion in the cases, the Court of Appeals in
Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913), at length adopted the English
rule (note 62 supra) that with certain exceptions there stated-to repair fences and
ways relating to party walls, to provide railway crossings, and in leases-the bn. of no
affirmative c. runs. The c. not enforced-to furnish water power for a flour mill-satis-
fied the twin requirements of section 82, since it was in aid of an easement granted by
the deed containing the c. This is the present New York law, Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N. Y. 248, 15 N. E. (2d) 793 (1938)
(upholding a c. to pay yearly assessments for maintenance of roads, parks, sewers, etc.;
action to foreclose a lien), though the exceptions appear substantial. Thus, a c. to repair
sewer and right of way runs, Greenfarb v. R. S. K. Realty Corp., 256 N. Y. 130, 175
N. E. 649 (1931), as does a c. to pay damages from sparks, ashes, etc. Morgan Lake
Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 262 N. Y. 234, 186 N. E. 685 (1933). See dis-
cussion of New York law in 1165 Broadway Bldg., Inc. v. City Investing Co., 120 F. (2d)
813 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 682 (1941) (upholding the running of
the bt. of a c. to repay a deposit).
The earlier New York law, therefore, is superseded, though the confusion of those
cases, and the misunderstanding of history shown, is probably the chief reason (at least
together with the original tangent taken by the Massachusetts cases) for such confusion
as has developed elsewhere. The early and often cited case of Van Rensselaer v. Hays,
19 N. Y. 68 (1859), stated the correct doctrine of privity by succession only; but the
court later became troubled by legal history, Harsha v. Reid, 45 N. Y. 415 (1871), and in
Cole v. Hughes, 54 N. Y. 444 (1873), made the surprising holding that a party-wall c.
must be considered only personal. [For the confusion this case has caused, reference is
made to the able criticism found in McCormick v. Stoneheart, 195 S. W. 883 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1'917).] Later cases naturally tried to limit this unworkably harsh rule. Hence in
Mott v. Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 312, 31 N. E. 1097 (1892), a party-Aval c. was allowed
to run; and still later cases, therefore, asserted a curious distinction that, while a c. for
the immediate building of a party wall could not run, yet one for building in the remote
future would. Cf. Crawford v. Krollpfeiffer, 195 N. Y. 185, 88 N. E. 29 (1909) ; Sebald
v. Mulholland, 155 N. Y. 455, 50 N. E. 260 (1898) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 140,
141; Clark, supra note 5, 37 HAiv. L. REV. 301. Meanwhile other cases created confu-
sion, and the court adopted even that devastating rule as to cs. of warranty that they could
not run except where the grantor had title or possession, which, as Rawle says, makes the
warranty useless when it is most needed. See RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TinnE (5th ed.
1887) 341 ; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 100. This rule as to warranties was adopted
in New York in Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N. Y. 212, 26 N. E. 611 (1891), 142 N. Y. 78, 36
N. E. 870 (1894), 147 N. Y. 456, 42 N. E. 17 (1895), 152 N. Y. 457, 46 N. E. 949
(1897), against powerful dissent in each case except the second, where the unanimous
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opinion ordering a new trial was favorable to a recovery. (This unfortunate warranty
rule, repudiated by the better authorities, has, quite occasionally, been resorted to as
justifying the privity rule, but obviously that cannot be so; for this rule applied only to
the running of bts., and comes from another background, namely, that a stranger to
a title cannot give a good deed of warranty as to it.) Other cases which have been cited
supported the running of various cs., Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb. Ch. 213 (N. Y. 1862)
(c. to share in maintenance of dam) ; Waterbury v. Head, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 361 (1887)
(same) ; and Nye v. Hoyle, 120 N. Y. 195, 24 N. E. 1 (1890) (same), with varying dicta.
All add color to the former New York picture, which, it is submitted, is a pwerful argu-
ment against the complications of the present Restatement.
North Carolina. Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1, 14 (1870) [e. fur cuntribution
to repair an existing canal runs; court limits its decision to a case where "easement
is apparent," but condemns the distinction drawn between lease and fee c. based upon
"privity of estate" as "arbitrary, and not a rule of reason, and may be dismissed as in-
sufficient"; see also Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70 N. C. 634 (1874)1; Herring v. Wallace
Lumber Co., 163 N. C. 481, 79 S. E. 876 (1913) (c. on sale of timber by the purchaser
to build a railroad to the timber upheld) ; Raby v. Reeves, 112 N. C. 688H, 16 S. E. 769
(1893) (c. to make monthly payments for an easement runs); Barringer v. Virginia
Trust Co., 132 N. C. 409, 43 S. E. 910 (1903) (c. on grant of water rights tW. maintain a
dam on other premises held personal); Parrott v. Atlantic & N. C. IL R., 165 X. C. 295,
81 S. E. 348 (1914) (grantee's c. to maintain flag station runs) ; Ring v. Mayberry, 168
.N. C. 563, 84 S. E. 846 (1915) (c. by grantee to maintain stairway runs).
Ohio. Maher v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., 55 Ohio App. 412, 9 N. E. (2d)
995 (1936) (c. in deed to pay assessment for opening street runs) ; Johnson v. American
Gas Co., 8 Ohio App. 124 (1917) (bn. of c. to furnish free gas to residence of promisee
upheld); Railway v. Bosworth, 46 Ohio St. 81, 18 N. E. 533 (18S) (grantor's c. to
fence on grant of right of way runs) ; Huston v. Cincinnati & Zanesville R. R., 21 Ohio
St. 235 (1871) (grantee's c. runs). These cases do not rely on privity. In Easter v. Little
Miami R. R., 14 Ohio St. 48 (1962), upholding the running of a grantor's c. to fence
adjoining lands, there are dicta that the Massachusetts requirements are met. In Ameri-
can Strawboard Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897) (per Lur-
ton, J., Harlan and Taft, .J., concurring-the bn. of a c. not to manufacture a certain
kind of product was held to run).
Oklahoma. Empire -Natural Gas Co. v. Southwest Pipe Line Cu., 25 F. (2d) 742
(N. D. Okla. 1928), aff'd, Southwest Pipe Line Co. v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 33 F.
(2d) 248 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (bn. of c. to purchase natural gas produced on leasehold
estate enforced, at least in equity, against the assignee of the leasehold).
Oregon. Beck v. Lane County, 141 Ore. 580, 18 P. (2d) 594 (1933) (c. by grantee
to maintain railroad crossing runs) ; Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore. 148, 279 Pac. 546 (1929)
(c. by grantee to maintain and keep open drainage ditch runs) ; Ford v. Oregon Elect.
Ry., 60 Ore. 278, 117 Pac. 809 (1911) (grantee's c. to maintain station runs) ; Brown v.
Southern Pac. Co., 36 Ore. 128, 58 Pac. 1104 (1S99) (c. in a deed whereby grantors
agreed to fence other land or not hold railroad for injury to stock was intended to he
personal) ; Houston v. Zahm, 44 Ore. 610, 76 Pac. 641 (1904) (c. by purchaser to open
and maintain public highway is personal, citing Massachusetts cases) ; Norby v. Section
Line Drainage Dist., 159 Ore. 80, 76 P. (2d) 966 (1938) (grantee's c. to maintain ditch
runs).
Pennsylvania. Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 Ad. 706 (1890) (bt. and bn. of agree-
ment adjusting water rights and extent thereof run) ; Bald Eagle Valley IL L v. Xittany
Valley R. R., 171 Pa. 284, 33 At. 239 (1895) (bn. of c. made in consideration of aid in
development of an iron company that the latter give all its traffic to a certain railroad runs;
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
injunction granted because damages are inadequate); Kelly v. Nypano R. R., 200 Pa.
229, 49 At. 779 (1901) (bn. of c. in grant of right of way to railroad that latter main-
tain fence runs, so long as privity of estate or period of enjoyment exists).
Rhode Island. Middletown v. Newport Hospital, 16 R. I. 319, 15 Ati. 800 (1888)
(c. for beach privileges upheld "in equity"; dictum that privity or tenure necessary "at
law").
South Carolina. Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S. C. 308, 181 S. E.
66 (1935) (c. to move a mill elsewhere and furnish power was intended to be personal).
South Dakota. Hill v. City of Huron, 33 S. D. 324, 331, 145 N. W. 570, 572 (1914)
[bt. of party-wall c. is personal, though bn. runs. Compare later case between the parties
after personal assignment, 39 S. D. 530, 165 N. W. 534 (1917)1.
Tennessee. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Webster, 106 Tenn. 586, 61 S. W. 1018 (1901)
(bn. of c. to maintain a fence does not run, because it was entirely on promlisor's land and
promisee railroad company had no easement); Carnegie Realty Co. v. Carolina C. &
0. Ry., 136 Tenn. 300, 189 S. W. 371 (1916) (c. on grant of land to maintain depot
runs) ; Doty v. Chattanooga Union Ry., 103 Tenn. 564, 53 S. W. 944 (1899) (similar).
Texas. McCormick v. Stoneheart, 195 S. W. 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) [party-
wall c. runs, criticizing the privity-of-estate rule; the case was criticized by Jones v.
Monroe, 262 S. W. 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), which, however, was reversed, 285 S. W.
1055 (Tex. Com. App. 1926), aff'd, 288 S. W. 802 (Tex. Com. App. 1926), upholding run-
ning]; Ball v. Rio Grande Canal Co., 256 S. W. 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (water-rights
c. runs) ; Parks v. Hines, 68 S. W. (2d) 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), aff'd, Hines v. Parks,
128 Tex. 289, 96 S. W. (2d) 970 (1936) (grantee's c. to extend electric and water lines
to other lands of grantor runs). In Panhandle & S. F. Ry. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. (2d)
501, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), upholding a party-wall c., there is a dictum, citing no
Texas cases, that privity is necessary. In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. State, 275 S. W. 673
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925), the bn. of a c. to maintain railroad shops runs even though the
benefit does not.
Virginia. Dickinson v. Hoomes's Adm'r, 8 Gratt. 353, 403, 404 (Va. 1852) (c. of
warranty runs; extensive criticism of the requirement of privity) ; Tardy v. Creasy, 81
Va. 553 (1886) (c. to abstain from business is personal, also void as in restraint of
trade, two judges dissenting).
Washington. Adamson v. Black Rock Power & Irrig. Co., 297 Fed. 905 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 630 (1925) (irrigation c. runs) ; Ellensburg Lodge
No. 20, 1. 0. 0. F. v. Collins, 68 Wash. 94, 122 Pac. 602 (1912) (party-wall c. runs).
West Virginia. Lydick v. B. & 0. R. R., 17 W. Va. 427, 436, 437 (1880) (c. by
grantee railroad to maintain a switch runs; query by the court whether privity of estate
is necessary); Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom & Mfg. Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S. E. 520
(1903) (c. to pay for maintenance of dam runs as an "equitable mortgage"); West
Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600 (1883) (c. not
to transport oil is void as in restraint of trade) ; Harbert v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 76
W. Va. 207, 84 S. E. 770 (1915) (bn. of c. in a lease to supply domestic gas runs, though
gas may be used away from the premises leased).
Wisconsin. Wooliscroft v. Norton, 15 Wis. 217 (1862) (c. on grant of land and
water to repair dam and water pump runs; privity exists in any event, though some
authorities state "the proposition much more broadly" iu favor of running) ; Crawford v.
Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 46 N. W. 545 (1890) (c. to render one-eighth of mineral and
to mine runs).
Wyomin'j. Lingle Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo.
41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931) (irrigation c. does not run; discussed in text p. 721 supra).
[Vol. 52: 699
19431 INSTITUTE'S LATV OF REAL COVENAINTS 737
APPENDIX II. INSTITUTE HISTORY IN RE PRIVITY
The question of a requirement of interparty privity of estate for the running of the
burden of a covenant had been debated at at least two earlier conferences of the Reporter
and his Advisers before the Reporter's material came up for a vote at the conference in
September, 1941. The minutes of that conference show that at the end of the discussion
on what is now section 82 an Adviser, after giving reasons for the omission of this re-
quirement, concluded, "and so I don't think this illogical doctrine is necessary or very
useful. All present agree." To which the Reporter said, "If I am unconvinced I shall
write a brief to show what the cases seem to require and the reasons of policy which I
think accord with that." MIxuTrs, CONFERENcE ON PROPRTY (2) (Sept. 1-6, 1941) 47, 4S.
With respect to the material which is now section 85, the Reporter stated that he was
not satisfied with the then form and that he would prepare another draft and asked for
suggestions; whereupon several were made looking for closer identification of the ma-
terial with the rule of "touching and concerning." Id. at 56-60.
After this conference the Reporter did not file a brief, nor did he medify his posi-
tion in later drafts; and it was then definitely agreed that the matter should go before
the Council-an understanding which was confirmed by correspondence, wherein the
issues were extensively explored, in January, 1942. The material did not come before
the Council until February, 1943, when Property (2) Council Draft No. 1, contain-
ing Chapter 2, sections 5 and 8, corresponding to present sections 82 and 85 respec-
tively, but without notation of dissent, was considered before it was distributed to the
Advisers. Section 5 was presented to the Council with the statement on behalf of the
Reporter, who was ill: "As Section 5 stands, in the opinion of all the Advisers except
one, it states the law as it is. judge Clark does not like the law, as it is md would like
to go beyond it. We all felt we could not go to the limit which Judge Clark wanted to
go." The Council, therefore, accepted it as "satisfactory" without record vote. T.:-;s-
CRPT, COUNCIL iMEErTiNG ON PRoPERY (2) (Feb. 23-26, 1943) 7, 8. As to section 8,
that did not then contain the words "in the physical use or enjoyment of land possessed
by him" now appearing in the first clause of (a) of section 85; and a long discussion xas
had as to its meaning, culminating in its re-reference back to the group for clarification
on the Acting Reporter's statement that "something is not in order" in the black let-
ter. Id. at 17.
Reconsideration having been sought on the ground that the position of the Advisers
had not been correctly stated, the matter came again before the Advisers in April, 1943;
and they then voted 4 to 3 in support of section 5, and 5 to 2 for the elimination of sec-
tion 8. Their stated reasons show that as to section 5, one supported it because he favored
a policy of keeping "the running as restricted as possible," one felt bound by the weight
of authority, another felt that a "slight preponderance" of cases favoring the Reporter
was supported by the prevailing opinion in the legal profession, as shown by text
writers, while the fourth approved on grounds of policy, since it cut down the running
of covenants and added a requirement bringing home to the promisor realization of the
importance of his act. The dissenters took essentially the position stated in this article.
MINuTEs, CoxFERnc ON Prorarv (2) (April 8-10, 1943) 14-28. As to section 8, all
of the four who had favored section 5 voted against this section except the first, who,
though expressing "a great deal of doubt about the matter," still favored the section as
a matter of policy. He was joined by one of those who had opposed section 5, but who
frankly said that this section was misnamed "Touching and Concerning" and that there
was a good deal of authority contrary; but on policy he thought land should not be bur-
dened by covenants where the benefit was in gross. The majority criticized the provi-
sion, inter alia, as a trouble-maker and not a correct statement of the "touching and con-
cerning" doctrine. Id. at 31-46.
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The matter then came before the Executive Committee, which heard the Reporter
and the writer and then took no action with respect to section 5, thus allowing it to
stand, but voted unanimously to strike section 8. But as to section 5, the only comment
made by committee members (outside of the officers) was unfavorable; of the four mem-
bers then present, one said he favored the views expressed by the writef and another ex-
pressed preference for the simplicity and clarity of statement of this position, but accepted
the weight of authority as viewed by the majority of the Advisers and the Reporter.
The other two said nothing. MINUTES, ExECUTIVE COMMITE ON PROPERTY (2) (April
17, 1943) 9, 10. Of two members who had left earlier one had stated that he was for, the
other that he was against, the position taken. This was reported to the Council as fol-
lows: "Your Executive Committee voted unanimously to recommend that you retain the
section." SPECIAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR TO THE COUNCIL, PROPERTY (2) (April 27, 1943) 5.
At the Council Meeting, May 10, 1943, at which only the Reporter was present in
addition to the Council members, the minutes show approval of both sections. MINUTS,
COUNCIL MEETING ON PROPERTY (2) (May 10, 1943) 5,6. But in the debate at the Annual
Meeting (not yet printed, but made available to the writer through courtesy of the Direc-
tor) a member of the Council stated that clause (b) of 85 was approved only by a slight
majority. The Annual Meeting after interesting debate voted approval of section 82
and clause (a) of 85; then as a motion for disapproval of clause (b) was being put, a
motion for its approval was substituted and voted down; a motion of disapproval was
voted down; and finally it was voted merely to re-refer the whole section to the group
"for further consideration and report next year." The debate showed a considerable
doubt as to these requirements upon the part of several members, and that they were
worried by the supposed weight of authority; and there was considerable confusion and
some well-taken criticism of the use made of the doctrine of "touching and concerning,"
although other members relied on this line of cases as supporting the privity require-
ments. With respect to the action taken by the meeting, the officers of the Institute have
reported that the meeting approved the Reporter's statement. See Goodrich, loc. cit. supra
note 53.
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